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Abstract 
 
This paper examines brokerage regulations in Central and Western Europe from approximately 1250 to 
1700. Based on a sample of 70 cities with more than 1609 sets of regulations, we find that brokerage 
was a multifunctional institution, which served matchmaking, quality certification, and tax collection 
functions, mainly in product wholesale markets but also in finance and real estate markets. We argue 
that the implementation of regulations for matchmaking and certification solved incentive problems 
related to asymmetric information between buyers and sellers, consequently improving the allocation 
process and fostering trade. In line with these results, we find that most brokerage regulations occur 
along trade routes and in merchant towns. 
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1. Introduction 
Studying the economic history of late medieval and early modern Europe is intriguing because of its 
trade-driven urbanization (Lopez 1976, Bairoch et al. 1988). Cities became specialized production 
and trade centers into which foodstuffs, inputs for local production, and non-locally manufactured 
products were imported and from which locally produced goods were exported. These trade flows 
were accompanied by economic regulations enacted by town governments (Hibbert 1967; Dijkman 
2011; Gelderblom 2013). A central aspect of the economic policy of medieval and early modern 
towns was the implementation and regulation of allocation mechanisms. Town statutes and 
regulations organized spot markets, intermediation, and bilateral trade. Examining the organization 
of allocation mechanisms is important because they determine the meeting of buyers and sellers, 
information aggregation, price formation and final transaction of goods. In this way, regulations of 
allocation mechanisms influence the (strategic) behavior of buyers and sellers, the matching and 
clearing efficiency, and the division of surpluses between buyers and sellers. Thus, allocation 
mechanisms can either create positive welfare effects or reduce welfare gains and thus determine 
the long-run growth of a town or, more generally, of a society.  
 
Analyzing these regulations in Central Western Europe is especially interesting because cities in the 
Holy Roman Empire were politically and economically autonomous (Heinig 1983; Isenmann 1989; 
Johannek 2000), as economic policy was made by municipal governments. These were 
representatives of Free and Imperial cities or of local worldly or ecclesiastical dukes. Territorial 
regulations imposed by the king or emperor were rare until the early modern period. Rather, 
common economic interests beyond the city borders were organized through commercial 
federations, such as the Hanseatic League (Dollinger 1966; Friedland 1991), or through smaller 
town leagues, such as currency unions (Boerner and Volckart 2011).  
 
In addition, this area of investigation offers manifold trade geographies. We can find land-, river- 
and sea-based trade routes connecting the Mediterranean to the Baltic and North Seas, Western and 
Eastern Europe. Cloth; inputs for textile production, such as wool, linen, fustian, fur and leather; 
dyes; spices; wine; fish; grain; construction materials; and many other types of products flowed 
along these trade routes during the study period (Kellenbenz and Walter 1986; Postan 1987).  
 
In this complex world, it is interesting to explore how allocation mechanisms were once designed 
and organized by municipal authorities and whether these designs solved incentive problems related 
to trade. In this paper, we will focus on one type of allocation mechanism – intermediation by 
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brokerage. The organization and regulation of brokerage in towns has been frequently documented 
during the study period but requires closer examination. Where, when, and for which kinds of trade 
goods can we find brokerage? Which kinds of brokerage regulations were introduced? Did the 
market participants and the towns that enacted and enforced these regulations gain economic 
benefits? 
 
Based on an analysis of brokerage policy in 70 cities in Central and Western Europe from 
approximately 1250 to 1700, this paper shows that cities used brokerage regulations to determine 
intermediation and trade activities. Town governments used brokerage as a multifunctional 
institution. Above all, it brought together buyers and sellers without a private intermediary. This 
clearing mechanism reduced the search, match and bargaining costs for both sides of the market.  
In addition, brokers performed quality control certification for goods and verified the 
creditworthiness of buyers. These functions solved Akerlof-type lemon problems (Akerlof 1970), as 
separating high from low-quality items reduced information asymmetry between buyers and sellers 
and thus increased trade. This type of quality control went beyond a simple weighing and measuring 
of products, requiring specific expertise and product knowledge from the broker. Both brokerage 
functions reduced negative externalities due to incentive problems based on asymmetric 
information and opportunistic buyer and seller behavior and thus improved welfare. This made 
towns attractive market platforms for buyers and sellers. Thus, brokerage promoted trade and 
created ex ante incentives for merchants to make trade investments. 
Brokerage also had a third function, tax collection. The role of brokers as tax collectors might 
indicate their use as the long arm of a rent-seeking town government or local ruler. However, it is 
difficult to assign brokerage to rent-seeking activities, except in a few cases. The collection of taxes 
may also have served the provision of local public goods, such as infrastructure or security. These 
three brokerage functions were sometimes complements but also occurred independently. 
Matchmaking and quality certification frequently appeared as complements.  
 
Furthermore, we can document these functions throughout the period under investigation. However, 
we find earlier more brokerage regulations related to matchmaking than to product certification. In 
addition, the certification of buyers can be only observed from the 15th century onwards, while 
brokerage regulations on tax collection are more evenly distributed around the average sample 
period. In addition, matchmaking and certification can be observed throughout the geographic area 
under investigation, but these functions are intensively documented along the main trade axis during 
the investigation period, that is, in the catchment area of the Rhine/Main Rivers to the Rhine-
Meuse-Scheldt delta and along the North and Baltic Seas. The distribution of brokerage regulations 
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of tax collection was regional. Furthermore, we show that these brokerage regulations covered a 
wide range of wholesale products. The appearance of regulations for certain products is documented 
along the corresponding trade routes and varies over time. Finally, the appearance of different types 
of brokerage designs is related to varying product, demographic and political characteristics. 
 
These variations support the argument that market policy was at least correlated with trade activities 
and likely had a positive impact on the economic development of pre-modern towns. Furthermore, 
the results suggest different allocation policy needs for different product markets over space and 
time to solve the information asymmetry problems of these different environments. 
 
We examine brokerage regulations from Central and Western Europe, roughly within the boundaries 
of the Holy Roman Empire north of the Alps. We collected brokerage regulations from 70 cities 
from 1250 to 1700, resulting in a sample of approximately 1609 sets of regulations. These 
observations are based on an analysis of 227 cities in the area with at least 5000 inhabitants during 
the period under investigation (following Bairoch 1988). We produce descriptive statistics and 
conduct statistical significance tests to demonstrate the robustness of the results. We restrict the 
empirical analysis to these descriptive statistics and conditional statistical tests based on the data we 
observe to reduce concerns about the validity of the estimated coefficients due incomplete data. 
 
In a next step, we interpret these results in terms of economic incentive theory. We show how these 
brokerage regulations shaped the incentives of intermediaries and market participants and solved 
different types of negative externality problems due to information asymmetry. We thus follow the 
methodological tradition established by Greif and others (Greif 1993, 1994, 2006; Greif et al. 1994).  
 
Furthermore, we embed this analysis in a single case study of the city of Cologne to place these 
results in a broader economic and historical context. Our analysis considers the multifunctionality 
of brokerage regulations. This allows us to investigate a long period and to engage in a 
comprehensive quantitative study of many towns and thus produce some generalizable findings. 
However, such an analysis comes at a price. In following such a methodology, we are precluded 
from discussing our findings in the broader institutional context of a city. The main brokerage 
functions (i.e., matching, certification, tax collection) may have been performed by other 
institutions and thus our results may be biased by non-observables. (Please see the methodological 
approaches of Gelderblom and Grafe 2010, Gelderblom 2013 motivated by Lane 1958 and the 
focus on the multifunctionality of institutions adopted by Ogilvie 2007.) Other market-making 
institutions might have served similar purposes and thus complemented or replaced the brokerage 
5 
 
function. To solve this problem, we use Cologne as a case study for both brokerage and other 
institutional designs. Consequently, we can discuss alterations of the results in what serves as a 
robustness check. However, we cannot generalize these findings to all cities with brokerage 
regulations (or even those without them). Thus, a study of more cities should be conducted.  
 
Finally, it is important to mention is that this paper offers an economic policy perspective based on 
a study of formal institutions, which captures a specific dimension of the issue. This study does not 
examine other dimensions such as the business performance of brokers in specific towns or periods 
by reviewing their account books or economic, political, and social roles. (See von Brandt 1954; 
Blendinger 1994.) Such investigations can be enlightening but are beyond the scope of this study. 
 
The study of brokerage has a long tradition in economic and legal history (Labandt 1861; Stuart 
1879; Goldschmidt 1882; Gilliodts- van Severen 1881; Ehrenberg 1885; Heymann 1898; Frensdorff 
1901, Pelsmaeker 1905, Dilis 1910, Toebelmann 1911; Beukeman 1912; van Houtten 1936; 
Schmieder 1937; van Houtte 1950; Schubert 1962; Blaum 1978). These scholars have produced 
descriptive case studies of individual towns. However, no systematic, quantitative, institutional 
incentive analysis has been conducted for brokerage regulations over the 1250-1700 period. Their 
contributions include the discovery of the first-source material and the identification of individual 
regulations. Their focus was the all-encompassing historical investigation of brokerage, and thus, 
these economic and legal historians did not engage in economic quantification or interpretation.  
 
Later scholars of medieval markets have concentrated on the monopoly power of guilds in local 
retail and export markets (Munro 1990, Hickson and Thompson 1991; Epstein 1998; Richardson 
2004). They conclude that such monopoly power was rather limited, although some guilds had 
monopolies in goods production in their hometowns, selling in local markets was competitive, and 
the exchange of products between towns was open and competitive. This was true both for raw and 
finished products in regional and long-distance trade. In complementary research, Gelderblom and 
Grafe (2010) examine the evolution of merchant guilds and find a significant correlation between 
the existence of merchant guilds and missing public market facilities. They argue that merchant 
guilds facilitated the matching of demand and supply in markets of limited size for long-distance 
trade goods. 
 
Related to this line of research on the role of guilds in medieval markets, a debate has arisen over 
the impact of medieval rent-seeking institutions that determined the allocations of goods in 
medieval markets. Ogilvie (2004, 2008, 2011) argues that rent-seeking institutions, especially 
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guilds, played important roles in limiting economic growth during the Middle Ages and the early 
modern period. In contrast, Epstein (1998, 2008) attributes positive effects to guilds due to their 
apprenticeships and contributions to technological change.  
 
Research by Greif and others (Greif 1993, 1994, 2006; Greif et al. 1994) has examined the 
institutions that enabled credit transactions and impersonal exchange in medieval markets. This line 
of research focuses on solving commitment problems among groups of merchants in long-distance 
trade. Overcoming this commitment problem is a necessary precondition of the market-making 
activities considered in this study. 
 
Finally, several monographs have studied related medieval market microstructures from a more 
holistic point of view (see, for example, Rothmann 1998, Reyerson 2002, Murray 2005, Zuijderduin 
2009, Davis 2011, Greve 2012, Dijkman 2011, Gelderblom 2013). 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the case study of Cologne. 
Section 3 expands the horizon to the whole investigation area, section 4 presents an economic 
interpretation of the regulations found, and section 5 returns to Cologne and compares institutions. 
In section 6, additional elements of brokerage that played a more important role in related studies 
are discussed. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Brokerage Regulations: The Case of Cologne 
 
We begin by examining the evolution of brokerage regulations in Late Medieval Cologne to gain an 
impression of the form, organization and use of brokerage in one of the most important economic 
and political cities of the Middle Ages. Cologne, one of the largest cities north of the Alps, had 
more than 40,000 inhabitants from the 13th to the 17th centuries (Bairoch 1988). It maintained its 
leading position until the 16th century. When the axis of trade shifted to the Atlantic by the end of 
the 16th and into the 17th century, Cologne could not keep pace with other growing cities, such as 
Hamburg and Amsterdam. Cologne’s economic importance was based on its local production, 
position along major trade routes (north-south and east-west) and strategic use of these routes 
(Kellenbenz 1967; Schönfelder 1970; Irsliger 1979). The latter involved implementing a staple 
market for many goods along the Rhine (Kuske 1939). In addition, Cologne’s strong trade and 
political interests are indicated by its participation in the Hanseatic League (Wollschlaeger 1988). 
Finally, merchants from Cologne could be found all over Europe at this time (Gramulla 1970; 
Hirschfelder 1996).  
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At the beginning of the 13th century, Cologne and the surrounding region were under the political 
and economic control of an archbishop (Lau 1898; Groten 1998) who was one of seven Kurfürsten 
(prince-electors) to crown the Holy Roman Emperor. The powers of this archbishop were gradually 
curtailed by the city’s patricians. By 1288, the bishop was had been forced to flee to Bonn after an 
abortive attempt to increase his power.2 The next two centuries brought about the incremental 
economic and political autonomy of Cologne. This change involved power over the legislation and 
jurisdiction, which influenced political and economic rights.3 In 1475, Emperor Friedrich III 
officially declared Cologne a free city (ruled only by the Emperor). In the early 13th century, a 
consulate of patricians played an advisory role for the archbishop, but over the centuries, it assumed 
more political and economic power4 (Militzer 1996). By the early fourteenth century, the legislative 
power of the consulate is documented in its protocols (Huiskes 1990). 
  
The appearance of the first brokerage regulations issued by the council coincides with this political 
development; the oldest records date to 1321. It is possible that there were earlier forms of 
brokerage based on a 12th century source document from Cologne and evidence of extensive 
regulations from the cities of Brugge, Dordrecht and Ypres (with which Cologne traded) during the 
second half of the 13th century.5  
 
The first known brokerage regulations in Cologne date to the first half of the 14th century: 
regulations for wine, grain, fur, and wood can be documented.6 These regulations restricted the 
intermediation activities of brokers to matching buyers and sellers, prohibiting brokers from 
engaging in private business. For a successful match, they received predetermined fees on a per unit 
basis or based on the final price. Furthermore, a broker was sworn in by the town council. The 
privilege of becoming a broker was limited, and a few brokers were usually appointed for each 
product. We have no exact figures for the 14th century and few for the 15th century. In the late 15th 
century, documents indicate four brokers for wine, four for cattle, and eight for horses.7 
The function of a broker as a matchmaker is documented for Cologne from the early 14th to the 
                                                 
2
 This reduced his influence in the city. However, he kept all his economic and political privileges at least nominally. 
3
    This included direct economic privileges such as coinage rights and taxation privileges (Heinig 1983, pp.289-292).      
      These privileges were gained with the help of the king using the weakness of the archbishop and rivalry between the        
       king and the archbishop (Ibidem, pp.267-270). 
4
   The council (Rat) was embedded in two partly representative boards: the Schöffengericht and the Richerzeche.    
      The latter has been documented since 1398. This process reveals a steady increase in political plurality. 
5
 For Cologne, see Toebelmann (1901, p.135); for Dordrecht and Brugge, see Hoehlbaum (1876, Hansisches 
Urkundenbuch I, nr 1090, nr 436), Gilliodt van Severen (1881, pp. 124-9); for Ypres, see Pelsmaeker (1905). 
6
    Stein (1895, II, pp. 5, 15, 19-21); Loesch (1907, II, pp. 122-126). 
7
    For wine, 1471: Stein (1895, II, p. 496); for horses, 1479: Ibidem (pp. 565f.); for cattle, 1482: Kuske (1917, II, pp.                                     
     470f.). 
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seventeenth centuries (and beyond).8 The right of brokers to engage in intermediation was 
exclusive. Other people were excluded from intermediation, and transgressors were punished.9 
Innkeepers were barred from participating in brokerage activities.10 However, some sources reveal 
that innkeepers had limited intermediation rights for their own customers during the early 15th 
century.11 Conversely, brokers were not allowed to host merchants.12 Furthermore, we have detailed 
evidence that brokers were not allowed to participate in any kind of business related to their work. 
They were not allowed to buy or sell, nor have any partners who did.13 We even have evidence of 
one broker who was not allowed to live with his father because they worked with in the same 
product; family members were not allowed to do business related to the product the broker was 
intermediating.14 Some regulations set time limits on these restrictions; for example, after 
terminating activities, a broker had to wait for one year to conduct private business.15 Early 
regulations also only allowed brokers to conduct business for people who were in town, and 
business by order was not allowed.16 Only in the late 15th century do sources mention that brokers 
provided intermediation for non-present merchants, and measures were taken to guarantee proper 
transactions.17 The brokerage fee was based on the transaction units and could not be changed. 
Typically, a fixed fee per unit was paid,18 but occasionally, fees were based on a percentage of the 
transaction price.19 In most cases, percentage fees were linear (in a few cases non-linear). Similarly, 
there was a fixed step function fee per unit.20 The fee was split equally between the buyer and the 
                                                 
8 
   However, due to a breakdown of the archive, the author had to work with selective sources for the regulatory details               
      for the second half of the 16th and 17th century. Thus, this case study focuses on sources from the 14th to the 16th            
      century. 
9
 In general, the exclusive right can be derived from the brokerage oath or directly from the regulations. The first 
exclusion statements related to punishment regulation date back to 1360: Stein (1895, II, pp.33-35); such regulations 
can be documented through the 15th century: for example 1407: Ibidem, (pp.178-81); 1450: Stein (1893, I, p. 36). 
10
 1348: Loesch (1907, II, pp.122-6); 1360: Stein (1895, II: pp.33f.); 1427: Ibidem (pp. 251-3); 1480: Loesch (1907, II, 
p. 119). 
11
 1400: Stein (1895, II, pp.129f.); 1407: Ibidem (pp. 178ff.); 1420: Ibidem, (pp. 129f.). 
12
 1370: Stein (1895, II, pp.53ff.); 1406: Ibidem (pp. 187f.); 1465: Kuske (1917, II, pp. 153-5); 1480: Loesch (1907, II, 
p.119). 
13
 The following are examples over the centuries: 1335: Stein (1895, II, p.5); 1375: Ibidem (pp. 61-65); 1407: Ibidem 
(pp. 178-181). 1450: Stein (1893, I, p. 353); 1490: Kuske (1917, II, pp. 827-840); 1587: Militzer (2005, I, p. 543). 
14 
  For the case of cattle brokerage in 1468, see Grote (1990, I, p.354); fish in 1467, Kuske (1917, II, pp. 153-6). 
15
 Stein (1893, II, pp. 33f.). 
16
 1365: Stein (1893, II, pp. 33-35). 
17
 For instance, the goods of non-present merchants had to be sent and stored in warehouses; see 1486: Stein (1893, II, 
pp. 603-607.) Alternatively, brokers had to announce the names of the absent merchants, and deals had to be testified 
and approved by a second broker; for wine regulations from 1490, see Kuske (1917, II, pp. 837-840). 
18
 Unit fees were set for homogeneous consumption goods; for grain in 1335, see Stein (1895, II, p.5); wine 1375: 
Ibidem (pp. 61-65), 1475: cattle 1470: Kuske (1917, II pp. 259-265), butter 1475: Ibidem (pp. 327-8), fish 1465: 
Ibidem, (pp. 153-156). 
19
 The percentage fees were paid for high-value goods with price variation, such as horses 1407: Stein (1895, II, pp. 
178-181), real estate and financial instruments 1401: Ibidem, (pp. 137f.), and some textile input products, such as 
linen 1370: Ibidem (pp. 50-1) or wool 1486: Ibidem (pp. 617-8). However, wood was also regularly subject to 
percentage fees; for example, 1370: Ibidem, (pp. 53-5). 
20
 We find non-linear percentage fees for horses in 1360 and 1365: Stein (1895, II, pp.33ff.). This means that a specific 
percentage must be paid up to a maximum price; then, after this threshold, a comparably lower percentage fee is 
9 
 
seller. Fixed fees can be documented from the beginning to the end of the sample. In some cases, 
brokerage income from fees had to be divided among all brokers from the same product.21  
We find source material for basic foodstuffs such as grain for the 14th and 15th centuries,22 fish for 
the 15th and 17th centuries,23 cattle and meat for the 15th and 17th centuries,24 wine from the 14th to 
the 17th centuries,25 and oil, fat, and butter for only the second half of the 15th century.26 In another 
large group, we find raw textile products, such as wool, linen,27 and cloth,28 and for fur, skins and 
leather products.29 We find evidence of brokerage for all these goods from the 14th through the 16th 
centuries. In another group, we identify spices, dyes, and salt,30 evidence for which can be found for 
the 15th and 16th centuries. For construction materials, we find wood, brick and shale from the 14th 
to the 16th centuries.31 Furthermore, we find evidence for metals (iron, steel, copper and lead) 
during the 15th century.32 Evidence of horse brokers exists for the 14th to the 17th centuries.33 
Finally, we document financial products such as money (gold, silver), bills of exchange, and rents 
from the 15th to the 17th centuries34 and brokerage for inheritance, land and houses for the 15th and 
16th centuries.35 
Another frequent broker obligation was to inform the buyer of the quality of the goods being 
intermediated. This service began with very simple information about the type and quality of goods 
available and included more specific statements that the broker had inspected the goods for quality 
and would not sell low-quality goods as high-quality goods. We find this type of quality 
certification by the broker from the middle of the 14th century.36 We find another type of quality or 
                                                                                                                                                                  
paid. Step-function fees can be found for cattle in 1450: Loesch (1907, II, pp.146-149). In this case, the merchant 
paid per unit, fixed fees up to a maximum price. For higher prices, he paid a higher fixed higher fee.  
21
 We have repeated evidence for wood and wine brokers. For wood brokers, see, for example, 1407: Stein (1895, II, 
pp. 187-8); for wine 1461: Ibidem (p. 387). 
22
 Examples are 1335: Stein (1895, II, p. 5); 1497: Ibidem, (p.694). 
23
 Examples are 1409: Groten (1990, I, p. 82); 1465: Kuske (1917, II, 153-6); 1485: Ibidem (pp. 500); 1530: Kuske 
(1905, p.267); 1624:Militzer (2005, I, p.671); 1682: Militzer 2005, II, p.916) 
24
 Examples are: 1448, Loesch (1907, I, pp. 147f.); 1470: Kuske (1917, II, pp. 259-265), 1544: Militzer (2005, I, 
p.369), 1596(Ibidem, p.586); 1645: Militzer (2005,  II, p. 765), 1690: Ibidem (p.693) 
25
 Examples are: 1321: Stein (1893, I, p.5); 1375: Stein (1895, II, p. 61-65); 1427: pp. 251-3; 1490: Kuske (1917, II, 
pp. 837-840); 1550: Groten, 1990 (V, p. 756); 1635: Militzer (2005, I, p.715); 1688: Militzer (2005, II, p.954) 
26
 Examples are 1475: Kuske (1917, II, pp.327-8); 1499: Ibidem, (p.792). 
27
 Examples are 1370: Stein (1895, II, pp. 50-3); 1400: Ibidem (pp. 13f.); 1486: Ibidem (pp. 617-8); 1546: Groten 
(1990, V, p.382). 
28
 Examples are 1360: Stein (1895, II, pp. 28-32); 1445: Loesch (1907 II, p. 457); 1529: Groten (1988, III, p. 152). 
29
 Examples are 1345: Stein (1895, II, p. 15), 1486: Ibidem (pp. 603-7); 1515: Groten (1989, II, p. 273). 
30
 Examples are 1400: Stein (1895, II, pp. 129-30); 1414: Ibidem (p.222); 1486: Ibidem (pp. 617-8), 1525: Groten 
(1988, III, p. 266).  
31
 Examples are 1370: Stein (1895, II, pp. 53-5); 1427: Ibidem (pp. 253-6), 1549: Groten (1990, V, p. 674). 
32
 Examples are 1418: Stein (1895, II, p. 222); 1486: Ibidem (pp. 610-5 and 617-8). 
33
   Examples are 1347: Loesch (1907, II, pp. 122-6); 1427: Stein (1895, II, p. 233), 1498: Kuske (1917, II, pp. 778-9),        
      1595: Militzer (2005, II, p. 577). 1604: Ibidem (II, p. 613).  
34
 Examples are 1418: Stein (1895, II, p.222), 1486: Ibidem (pp. 617-8.), 1589: Militzer (2005, I, p. 555), 1698: 
Militzer (2005, II, p. 1017) 
35
 Examples are 1401: Stein (1895, II, pp. 136-7); 1450: Stein (1893, I, pp. 332f.); 1587: Militzer (2005, I, p. 547), 
1675: Militzer (2005, II, p. 872). 
36
 We found one source from 1365 for horse brokerage, which discusses product information revelation. Other sources 
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buyer creditworthiness certification only since the 15th century; the first statement dates to 1407, 
but more frequent statements appear only from the second half of the 15th century.37 Whereas we 
find matchmaking activities for all major product types, information about certification was more 
selective. We find ample evidence for fish,38 wine,39 spices,40 construction materials,41 and horses42 
but only single observations for textiles, financial products and properties43. For credit quality, we 
find few observations: two for spices and one each for horses, linen, cattle, lead, fur, houses and 
property. 44 
Using the service of a broker was generally not mandatory. In rare cases, merchants were forced to 
use a broker. We find some evidence of this for construction materials during the late 14th and early 
15th centuries. We find frequent evidence for wood.45 Furthermore, the compulsory use of brokerage 
is documented for salt.46 During the early 16th century, obligatory brokerage for foreigners was 
frequent for wine.47 A general brokerage obligation, particularly for foreigners, is repeatedly 
documented over a longer period, for instance, in Brugge (Giliodts-van Severen 1881); however, 
this requirement is not observed in this source investigation. 
Beside matchmaking and quality revelation, we find scant evidence that the broker was responsible 
for complementary collection of a general market tax or trade completion tax.48 Thus, the broker did 
not regularly extract taxes that created an income stream for the city. However, the town profited 
indirectly from the brokers when they had to pay a fixed annual lease for their business49 or a 
fraction of their brokerage fees.50 
These rules also detailed the penalties. We find monetary penalties for brokers who did not follow 
                                                                                                                                                                  
start from 1400. Examples are 1400: Stein (1893, I pp. 129f.); 1407 Ibidem, (pp. 157ff.); 1450: Loesch (1907, II, 
p.53); 1486: Stein (1895, II, p.618f.); for more and later examples see the following footnotes about different 
products. 
37
 1407 for horses: Stein (1895, II, pp. 178ff), further examples are 1450 for spices: Stein (1893, I, p.353); 1470 for 
cattle: Kuske (1917, II, pp. 259ff.); 1489 for houses and rents: Stein (1895, II, pp. 618f.) 
38
 An example is 1465: (Kuske 1917, II, pp. 153ff.); for a detailed investigation of quality control in fish markets and 
the role of fish brokers, see Kuske (1905). 
39
 Examples include 1407: Stein (1893, I, pp. 151ff.); 1427: Stein (1895, II. 251ff.); 1550: Militzer (2005, I, p. 397). 
40
 1407: Stein (1895, II, pp. 190f.); 1414: Ibidem (p. 217); 1450: Stein (1893, I, p. 360f.); 1486: Stein (1895, II, pp. 
607ff.) 
41
 Examples are 1407: Stein (1895, II, p. 184); 1435: Ibidem (p. 280f.), 1450: Kuske (1917, II, pp.1ff.)   
42
 1365: Stein (1895, II, pp. 33ff.); 1407: Ibidem (pp. 178ff.). 
43
 1466 for linen: Stein (1895, II, pp. 412ff.); 1486 for fur: Ibidem (pp. 596ff); 1486 for houses and rents: Ibidem (p. 
618f.). 
44
 For spices 1450: Stein (1893, I, 360f.); 1486: Stein (1895, II, pp. 607ff.); for the other products in the order of the 
text: 1407: Ibidem, (178ff.); 1466: Ibidem, (pp. 412ff.); 1469: Kuske (1917, II, pp. 259ff.); 1486: Stein (1895, II, 
pp.613ff.); 1486: (Stein, 1895, II, pp. 596ff.); 1486: Ibidem (pp. 618f). 
45
 1370: Stein (1895, II, pp. 53ff.); 1407: Ibidem (pp. 187f.); 1427: Ibidem (pp. 253ff). 
46
 1407: Stein (1895, II, pp. 190f.); 1414: Ibidem (p. 217). 
47
 1519, 1522, 1523: Militzer (2005, I, pp. 311ff.). 
48
 1400, 1420: Stein (1895, II, pp. 129f).; 1486: Ibidem (pp. 603ff); 1486: Ibidem ( 607ff.); 1486: Ibidem (pp.618f.). 
49
 For example, for cattle 1470: Kuske (1917, II, pp. 259ff.) or oil 1499: Ibidem (p. 792). 
50
 However, we only document such brokerage fees in a few instances; for example, for lead 1486: Stein II (1895, pp. 
513ff.) or leather 1486: Ibidem (pp.603-7). 
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the rules. When they did not pay the fines or repeatedly violated regulations, brokers were 
imprisoned for several months or expelled from the city for several years, and they lost their jobs. 
The heaviest penalties were levied for violating prohibitions on private business and charging more 
than the specified fees.51 Similar penalties were imposed on people who engaged in brokerage 
without permission.52 The application of these penalties is recorded in the protocols of the city 
council, which also document investigations of brokers, probationary periods, and dismissals.53  
  
 
3. Brokerage Regulations in Central Western Europe 
 
3.1 Data and Statistical Interpretation 
Having analyzed Cologne as a case study, we proceed to a more comprehensive study of Central 
Western Europe, which mainly covers the Holy Roman Empire north of the Alps. Map 1 depicts all 
the cities analyzed in this area. We investigate cities that had at least 5000 inhabitants (following 
Bairoch 1990). Map 1 differentiates cities with and without brokerage regulations.54 We found 
approximately 1233 sources that can be categorized into 1609 sets of brokerage regulations for 
these 70 cities.55 The information quality of these sources depends on the city and period. For some 
cities, we have only a few years of documentation; for others, we have centuries of very detailed 
information. The density of brokerage regulations over several centuries often correlates with the 
economic importance of the city. In addition to Cologne, we also have long series for Brugge, 
Frankfurt, Leipzig, Strasbourg, Hamburg and Amsterdam. However, such series also exist for 
smaller merchant cities, such as Constance or Wuerzburg. Some source texts contain only a few 
lines while others are several pages long. Some regulations are written in an abstract form, others as 
applied regulations pertaining to a case. Still others are cases and relate to regulations. The 
transitions between stages of forms and types of sources are fluid. Therefore, clear differentiation of 
                                                 
51
 Examples include 1335 for grain: Stein (1895, II, p.5); 1365 for horses: Ibidem (pp. 33ff.); 1407 for wood: Ibidem 
(pp. 87f).; 1465 for fish: Kuske (1917, II, pp. 153ff.). 
52
 Examples include 1360 for horses: Stein (1895, II, pp. 33f.); 1409 for spices: Ibidem (pp. 201ff.); 1470 for cattle: 
Kuske (1917, II, pp. 259ff.). 
53
 Examples include 1410: Groten (1990, I, p. 84); 1484: Ibidem (p. 683); 1527: Groten (1988, III p. 434). 
54
 The 13th century is a natural starting point, as we do not document any brokerage regulations before this time in the 
area of investigation. There is fragmented evidence of a type of intermediary, the so-called “Lychtkeuffer” in the 
southern region of the area, but they do not seem to have had an official legal status or to have been obligatory. 
Comparable brokerage institutions from the 13th century onwards can be documented in the Mediterranean, 
particularly in Italian merchant cities during the 11th and 12th centuries. (For an extensive debate, see Laband 1861, 
Goldschmidt 1882, Toebelmann 1911, Schmieder 1937.) 
55
 This study is based on a translation and analysis of original edited and non-edited documents containing several 
thousands pages of documents in various Germanic dialects. This study, which lasted for several years, captured a 
large share of brokerage documents, which hopefully provides a representative characterization of the period and 
area under investigation. Of course, such a study can never be complete, and the discovery of new material will 
further qualify the picture. 
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types of sources and further categorization is not possible. Consequently, we aggregate the 
information derived from the original source material.56 
Due to the fragmented nature of the data, we also provide only descriptive statistics. We examine 
different types of brokerage functions in different cities and determine whether these observations 
statistically and significantly relate to time, demographic, geographic and political variables. In 
addition, we analyze how different brokerage regulations are statistically related to different product 
types. We report statistical significance tests as chi-square tests for categorical variables and as t-
tests to compare the means of continuous variables, such as population size or source year.57  
The focus of this quantitative analysis is on the three brokerage functions we have identified in 
Cologne and their role in the sample.58 We identified brokers as matchmakers, as quality certifiers, 
and as tax collectors. As matchmakers, brokers received a fixed fee for each match they made, but 
they were not allowed to buy and re-sell on their own account.59 In addition, we found that brokers 
acted as quality certifiers. Here, we differentiate between ensuring the quality of the transacted 
goods and the creditworthiness of the debtor. Finally, as tax collectors, brokers collected extra taxes 
that were complementary or directly linked to the transaction. The town could also profit indirectly 
by receiving portions of the brokerage fees or requiring annual leases for brokerage licenses. This 
suggests monetary transfers to the town that may have served public goods purposes but may also 
have reflected rent-seeking activities. In addition to these three functions, we report a regulation that 
gave brokers the exclusive right or privilege to conduct brokerage business. This is a pre-condition 
for any of the three intermediation functions. We will report this requirement in the statistics but 
will not discuss it in detail because it represents a large share of the regulations and follows the 
distribution of the sample. Interesting variation is observed when comparing the three functions. 
Furthermore, we will interpret these results in this chapter, but we will discuss these three functions 
from an economic perspective in chapter 4. Other functions that have been identified in previous 
                                                 
56
 We have to address one specific challenge when weighting the data appropriately because in some cities, sources 
refer only to one type of product and related regulations and other sources refer to different products with 
differentiated regulations. To make these sources and regulations comparable and to incorporate different products, 
we consider the regulations for the different product types in one source separately. (For the identified different 
products, see sub-section 3.5.) This increases the number of regulations from the actual source documents slightly 
but gives a more accurate comparative perspective. (However, the overall results do not change w.r.t. the identified 
differences and statistical significance if we consider the statistics of the original sources without weighting and 
identifying by product.) 
57
  We avoid more advanced econometric investigation due to the fragmented data, the high number of binary        
      explanatory variables and likely strong endogeneity between different variables. 
58
   A statistical analysis and comparison of cities with and without brokerage regulations can be found in Boerner   
      and Quint (2016), which also provides a more detailed analysis of the matching design we discuss herein. 
59 
  In some towns, we find a weaker form of intermediation wherein the broker received fixed fees per                                                   
      match made but no clause forbade private business. We discuss such variations in detail in   
      Boerner and Quint (2016). 
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studies are small compared to the aggregate number of observations. We will comment on some of 
these functions in section 6. 
 
3.2 Different Brokerage Designs 
Table 1, columns (1) and (2) provide the number of observations for the designs and the number of 
towns for which these regulations can be documented. We find matchmaking in 32 towns (409 
observations) and quality certification in 26 towns (242 observations). Moreover, we find product 
certification in 24 towns (235 observations) and debtor certification in 11 towns (128 observations). 
Finally, tax collection is observed in 24 towns (172 observations).  
 
In some cases, these functions are used in combination with other regulations, while in other cases, 
they are stated exclusively. Table 1 also provides these statistics. The mention of all three functions 
in one regulation was rare. We document this only 23 times in seven towns. Most of the time, we 
find matchmaking and certification as complementary functions, a pairing that is observed 124 
times in 16 towns. Regulations combined with taxes occur less frequently. The number of the 
exclusive observations is smaller in each group, but the proportions look similar. It is important to 
mention that exclusive or combinations of functions in specific city regulations do not generalize to 
the whole sample of regulations of a town. For instance, in Cologne and Frankfurt, we find 
regulations for both matchmaking and quality certification; however, there are also regulations for 
matchmaking and quality certification alone. This finding is also in line with the aggregate 
numbers. Whereas we find the complementary use of matchmaking and certification in 16 cities, 
both functions are applied (not necessarily in the same regulation) in 19 towns.60 In contrast, the 
exclusive use of one type of regulation in a city over the complete investigation period is rare. The 
exclusive mention of the broker as a certifier occurs in two towns; as a tax collector, in three. 
Regulations on matchmaking are found for only eight towns. 
 
These findings confirm previous reports that matchmaking was the predominant brokerage 
obligation. Furthermore, the application of different brokerage designs in the same town must be 
investigated. We will later relate this phenomenon to product characteristics, place and time. 
 
 
3.3 Design and Period 
An examination of the timing of the implementation of these regulations yields the following 
                                                 
60
 Such patterns are also found for other (combinations) of rules. 
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picture. Table 1, column (3) shows the average year for each brokerage design, and column (4) 
provides the earliest and latest observations.61 Matchmaking tends to be performed first. We find an 
average year of 1454, significantly earlier than the average year of the sample. Revelation of 
quality, with an average year of 1550, and creditworthiness, with an average year of 1609, are 
introduced significantly later. Taxation, with an average of 1473, occurs slightly later than 
matchmaking but is not significantly different from the distribution of the whole sample. This order 
can be confirmed by analyzing the numbers for exclusive implementation of specific types of 
regulation, showing even clearer results for the earlier introduction of the matchmaking function. 
We find an average year of 1392 for matchmaking; for taxation, 1468; and for quality revelation, 
1528. This exclusive implementation of a regulation can be interpreted as the only function for a 
specific time and product or, at least, as the specific emphasis of the regulation. 
 
Whereas the average year for the exclusive implementation of a specific brokerage design is earlier 
than for the average year of all observations for a specific brokerage function, the identified 
combination of different designs occurs later than the average numbers for all the observations. For 
example, the most frequent combination matchmaking and quality revelation occurs in 1579. This 
pattern indicates an increase in the complexity of designs over time. 
 
Finally, if we look at the first and last implementations of these rules, we observe that most 
regulations can be documented from the beginning to the end of the sample. The exception is credit 
quality control, which can be observed only from 1406. We see the use of this type of regulation 
first in the important merchant towns of Frankfurt and Cologne. However, their use can be 
documented from the second half of the 16th century into the 17th century. Furthermore, cities that 
had already introduced certification of debtors had already introduced product quality certification 
regulations.62 
Consequently, we conclude that the matchmaking and certification functions of the broker were 
known and used over the whole period, but the emphasis changed. Only the certification of the 
buyer creditworthiness appeared during this time. The use of a broker as tax collector occurred over 
the whole period, and the mean and standard deviation are consistent with the whole sample, which 
indicates no time-specific variation. We discuss the economic reasons for such time-specific effects 
in the next section. 
                                                 
61
 The corresponding t-tests compare the differences between the mean of the specific design and the mean of the other 
observations and can be found in table 1A, Column (1). 
62
 The only exceptions are the regulations from Danzig in 1597(Simson 1904), where credit quality control is 
introduced without the previous or simultaneous existence of  product quality certification in any brokerage 
regulations. 
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How consistently these regulations were implemented is more difficult to determine from an 
aggregate perspective. For Cologne, we document a regular implementation after the first evidence 
for the complete period of source coverage. Such dynamics can also be observed in other cities for 
which we have long-run data, such as Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig and Constance. Further 
generalization is not possible. 
 
3.4 Design, Demography, and Geography 
In their comparison of cities with and without brokerage regulations, Boerner and Quint (2016) 
show that cities with brokerage are larger,63 more likely to be located on water trade routes (sea or 
river access), and have more trade routes64 passing through the city than places without brokerage. 
All these variables indicate stronger trade activities, and therefore, the statistically significant 
relationship indicates that brokerage regulations corresponded with and likely supported trade 
activities. Can these city characteristics identify and explain differences in brokerage functions? 
 
Table 1, column (5) compares brokerage functions and shows that tax collection is performed by 
brokers in smaller towns, on average (i.e., those with approximately 16,000 inhabitants). This 
smaller size can also be confirmed for any tax collection combination. The average size of cities 
with this regulation deviates significantly from the average population size of the whole sample 
(approximately 35,000); these towns are clearly smaller than those that rely on the matchmaking 
function (a population size of approximately 39,000) and product certification (35,000).65 The cities 
with combinations of both are larger (approximately 42,000 inhabitants) than those with single 
observations and are clearly larger than any other combination. Only cities that rely on creditor 
certification are larger (49,000 inhabitants).  
Assuming stronger and more complex economic activity in larger towns, the observations for these 
trade-supporting brokerage regulations are in line with the results in Boerner and Quint (2016). The 
smaller average population of cities with a tax collection function may have two explanations. On 
the one hand, smaller cities with less trade interest might use the broker solely as a tax collector, 
while larger trade towns had less interest in enforcing taxation mechanisms, which might deter 
merchants from visiting the town. On the other hand, larger towns were probably accustomed to 
higher trade volumes and used specialists to collect taxes. Smaller towns were more likely to allow 
                                                 
63
 To compare city sizes, the Bairoch (1988) population data have been used. These figures are approximations, and 
the resulting statistics can only be used to approximate a comparative perspective. 
64
 For access to water trade routes and the number of trade routes (inclusive of water trade routes) passing through a 
city, see Putzger (1956), p.70. 
65
 The corresponding significance tests are reported in table 1A, column (2). 
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a broker to fulfill several functions in one role. 
 
As 89% of the towns with brokerage regulations are located along rivers or seacoasts, there is not 
much water trade route variation in the sample, which might explain differences in brokerage 
designs. It is worth mentioning that the likelihood of implementing creditor certification, as well as 
both matchmaking and quality revelation, in one regulation was higher in seaport towns. These 
results are in line with previous observations: seaport towns tend to be larger and to have stronger 
economic activity. In contrast, harbor cities are less likely to use brokerage for its tax collection 
function. This difference might reflect a weaker interest in any type of collection activity but may 
also reflect a large volume of goods entering and the need for specialists to collect different taxes.  
 
The geographical distribution of cities with different types of brokerage designs is in line with these 
results. Whereas the matchmaking (map 2) and certification (map 3) functions are equally 
distributed among cities with brokerage regulations,66 towns with trade-supporting brokerage and 
matchmaking and certification functions (not necessarily combined in the same observation) were 
located near important trade areas during the period under investigation. We find strong evidence in 
the catchment area of the Rhine, with observations dating at least to the 14th century. We have 
evidence along Rhine in Switzerland and southern Germany, from Constance, Basel, Schlettstadt, 
and Strasbourg down to Worms, Koblenz, Cologne, Dordrecht, Middleburgh, and Antwerp. 
Furthermore we have evidence along the tributaries of the Rhine along the Mosel River in Trier and 
the Main River in Frankfurt, Würzburg, and Nuremberg and along a land route extension to the 
Main connecting Southern German cities to Italy. Other observations start in the 16th century either 
along the coast (Amsterdam, Hamburg, Danzig) or in the eastern (Leipzig and Breslau). These 
observations are in line with the differences in regional importance over time. The north-south axis 
along the Rhine has been one of the most important economic regions since the Middle Ages 
(Irsliger 2010), while coastal cities gained in importance during the 15th and 16th centuries, which 
was also related to the rise of Atlantic trade. Finally, eastern cities, such as Leipzig, Breslau or 
Danzig, prospered during the early modern period (Kellenbenz and Walter 1986). 
 
The use of a broker as a tax collector, however, seems to have been a regional function (map 4), 
which we find mainly in towns in Flanders, Zeeland, and South Holland and in southwestern 
Germany. In the latter region, this function was also apparent in smaller towns, which might explain 
                                                 
66
 Some Hanseatic towns along the Baltic and North Seas, particularly during the 14th and 15th centuries, seem to be 
outliers. In these cities, we find less frequent restriction of brokers from private business. As outlined earlier, these 
cities belong to a group for which we find a weaker form of intermediation. 
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the significantly smaller population observed for this function. 
 
 
3.5 Goods and Designs 
Furthermore, we differentiate the observations by product types (table 2).67 We find brokerage for 
basic foodstuffs, such as grain, fish, cattle, meat, wine, beer,68 oil, fat and butter.69 In addition, we 
find brokerage for spices and dyes. Another set of products includes goods from the textile industry, 
such as raw textiles (in particular, wool, linen, fustian, and later, cotton), cloth, fur, skins and 
leather. Next, brokers for construction material can be found, which includes wood, bricks, and 
metals (iron, copper, tin, lead, and quicksilver). Then, we identify brokerage for finance, which 
includes bills of exchange, rents, and insurance, as well as silver and gold. Finally, we find brokers 
for property: land, houses, and inheritance. All groups but the latter are brokers for wholesale trade. 
 
We find all of these product groups from the very beginning of our study period until the 17th 
century. We also detect variations in their frequency over time.70 Brokerage regulations for 
construction materials, financial products, and houses are observed significantly later than the 
average of sample period. Food products (with the exception of fish), horses, and textiles (cloth and 
raw inputs) are observed earlier than average, where textiles are significant. This pattern might be 
explained by the importance of some products and information asymmetry that characterized certain 
markets over time. Whereas the organization of food markets and textiles supported and secured the 
basic food supply and the distribution of input goods for the local producing manufacturing industry 
in earlier times (Hibbert 1967), respectively, the development of financial markets (Denzel 2008) 
and the growth of cities subsequently created a need for brokers for financial products, construction 
materials, and property.71 The later, more frequent observations of brokers for construction 
materials can be explained by worsening wood shortages due to deforestation during the late 15th 
and 16th centuries (von Below and Breit 1998; Radkau and Schäfer 2007), which might explain the 
creation of an official intermediary to improve (and potentially control) the allocation process. 
 
Furthermore, the geography of brokerage regulations can be extended to specific types of products. 
                                                 
67
 We present these products as they are grouped in the documents. 
68
 Normally, either wine or beer is mentioned, depending on the region. 
69
 Butter gains prominence over time. 
70
 The average period for each product type can be found in table 2, column (3); the earliest and latest observations, in 
column (4). The corresponding significance tests comparing means are reported in table 2A, column (1). 
71
  These results also fit with the city sizes: these three product types can be found in larger cities. On the contrary, the                
     observations for the other product types are smaller with the exception of grain (which is linked to seaport towns,  
     which tend to be larger). 
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For instance, we find grain brokerage along the coasts of the North and Baltic Seas (map 5) (and, 
thus, along the shipping routes from producing areas in the east to consuming towns in the west) 
(van Tielhof 2002; Jahnke 2015, pp. 215ff.) and wine brokerage along the wine-producing areas 
(map 6) and trade routes of the Rhine, Main, and Mosel Rivers (Volk 1993; Rose 2011). The 
descriptive statistics support these findings.72 The likelihood of grain brokerage increases when a 
town is located on the sea. Additionally, the share of wine brokerage among river towns is higher. 
Furthermore, we find brokerage for construction materials almost exclusively along water routes. 
Bulky construction material might have been transported via these water trade routes as occurred 
historically in the transportation of wood, which was normally floated down rivers (von Below and 
Breit 1998, pp.38f.). Then, we find brokers for horses in towns where many trade routes intersect, 
rarely observing them in coastal cities.73 Horses were used for transportation along land trade 
routes. The same logic can be applied to cattle, which was driven along land trade routes to regional 
markets (Westermann 1979). Again, we find that a high mean of the number of transportation routes 
increases the likelihood of cattle brokerage, with a corresponding a very low likelihood along the 
seaside. Finally, we find a similar pattern for fish brokerage: a lower likelihood in seaside towns and 
a higher probability along river towns with many intersecting trade routes. This pattern might be 
surprising at first glance because a large share of the consumed fish came from the North and Baltic 
Seas (Sicking and Abredu-Ferreira 2009). However, the need for intermediaries to improve the 
allocation due to information asymmetry might have been higher in intersecting inland towns, 
where ships from the Baltic and North Seas (via river trade routes) met local demand and wholesale 
traders organized distribution along land trade routes, than in seaside towns where local fish 
markets could satisfy demand directly. Kuske (1905, pp. 227ff.) applies this argument to the success 
of inland Cologne, one of the largest wholesale fish markets at the time.  
 
The list and interpretation of products could be extended. However, the main insight is that the 
geographical location of brokerage for specific product types indeed matches the trade geography of 
the time. 
 
The population effects of different products are not very significant.74 We find smaller populations 
                                                 
72
   The percentage of cities located on a river or by the sea and the average number of trade routes passing through a 
city for a specific product type can be found in table 2, columns (7)-(9). The corresponding significance tests of the         
      statistical relationship (chi-square tests) can be found in table 2A, columns (3) and (4), and the comparisons of  
      different means for the trade routes are in column (5). 
73
   A higher number of trade routes typically proxies for an increase in the number of land trade routes. Rarely does 
      more than one river pass through a town or city on the seaside, and the directions and trade routes are limited by the                
      sea. 
74 
 The descriptive statistics can be found in table 2, columns (5) and (6) and the corresponding significance tests in       
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for cities with brokerage for products such as horses, cattle, and fish, which are related to locations 
with more trade routes and, consequently, to a higher number of land trade routes. These cities tend 
to be smaller than cities along sea trade routes, which is related to their potential for trade. 
Furthermore, cities with wine brokerage are significantly smaller because brokerage existed in 
many small, wine-producing towns in the southwest part of this area, which were less engaged in 
other trade activities and had less growth potential. Finally, cities with brokerage in finance were 
significantly larger than average cities with brokerage. Again, this is because larger cities with more 
trading activity had a greater need for a specialized financial markets and brokers.  
 
We see other interesting variations if we analyze the importance of brokerage designs for different 
product types.75 Matchmaking brokerage policies were related to raw textiles and to the fur, skin, 
and leather product types. Furthermore, we find significant relationships with wine and beer, 
construction materials, and finally, products that were traded in warehouses, such as spices, dyes, 
metals, oils and fats. The next section offers a more detailed economic explanation.  
Product quality certification is significant for fish, cattle and meat, and construction materials, while 
buyer creditworthiness is more closely related to valuable categories, such as spices, dyes, furs, 
skins, property and financial products. However, we also find evidence for wine and beer.  
 
Finally, we find the use of brokers as tax collectors for easily transportable goods, such as cattle and 
horses, or products with decentralized trade, such as wine, which was sold in wine cellars, and 
grain, which was often sold in many places at the same time. Horses can be assigned to this 
category because they were infrequently centrally traded. (We will provide further evidence for the 
case of Cologne in section 5.) Thus, the evidence indicates that this brokerage function was used 
where business transactions could be conducted non-centrally and quickly, the products were easily 
(re)moved, and the collection of taxation could be problematic. 
 
Other Effects: Design and politics 
In a complementary study, Boerner and Quint (2016) show that political institutions can account for 
brokerage regulations, which are more likely to be found in Free Imperial Cities and university 
towns than in territorial and bishop cities. This supports the idea of brokerage as a trade-supporting 
institution and points to the importance of educational institutions, which produced town officials 
who could read, write, and enforce regulations (Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014). Along this line, we 
ask whether (political) institutions had an effect on the formation of brokerage designs. However, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
      table 2A, columns (2).  
75
 The descriptive statistics and significance tests can be found in tables 3 and 3A.  
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the observed variation is not strong and, thus, the explanatory power limited.76 Whereas the 
implementation of brokerage regulations seems to have been politically motivated, variation in 
brokerage regulations can be explained in terms of product markets, trade routes, and time effects. 
 
 
4.  An Economic Interpretation 
Having identified these three types of city regulations on an aggregate level, a more detailed 
economic interpretation needs to be provided. We begin with a discussion of the benefits of an 
official intermediary matchmaker. 
 
The meeting of buyers and sellers in a medieval or early modern town was characterized by various 
matching difficulties. Sellers offered a variety of horizontally and vertically differentiated products. 
Textile products are a good example. Here, we can find the creation of new types and product 
standards in European regions, which was driven by competition and steady demand for new types 
of clothing (Munro 1998, 2003). Another example is the influx of exotic spices that needed to be 
matched to developing demand for new flavors (Freedman 2008). In addition, many products, such 
as wine, horses and cattle, are unique or have a unique qualities (Volk 1993; Rose 2011).  
 
Furthermore, merchants might have different preferences over the values of the goods purchased or 
sold. Whereas all sellers must have been happy to receive high final selling prices, buyers had a 
preference for low purchase prices. Two sellers of similar products might had different minimum 
selling prices due to production or transportation costs; buyers could also have different reservation 
prices due to variations in tastes or future processing costs (e.g., if they used these products as 
intermediate inputs). Such a variety of qualities and price preferences77 can create matching 
problems between buyers and sellers. Consequently, if merchants meet randomly in a decentralized 
fashion, the likelihood of striking a deal decreases due to expected price/quality mismatches, and 
potential welfare gains cannot be realized. Thus, the huge variety of product quality, preferences, 
and tastes might explain the statistically significant relationship between the matching brokerage 
function and some product types.  
 
In addition, a bilateral meeting of buyers and sellers creates the need to bargain and agree on a 
clearing price. In such a process, incomplete information creates incentives for merchants to hide 
their preferences: buyers have an incentive to underreport their reservation price and sellers to 
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  We do not present or discuss these results in detail. 
77
 A counter argument for such price variations would be that prices on medieval markets were often fixed and 
regulated. However, there is little evidence of this in wholesale markets.   
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overreport their reservation values, thus creating additional trading problems and leading to fewer 
matches.78 The existence of such a bargaining space due to incomplete information can indeed be 
derived from some brokerage regulations in which brokers are reminded not to reveal information 
to one party to increase bargaining power to increase or decrease prices. For instance, the broker 
should not reveal that one side urgently needs to buy or sell, is rich or poor, or is uncertain if about 
the purchase.79 In addition, the lack of public price information that fostered such asymmetry can be 
derived from the fact that official price lists evolved over time; starting mainly in the 17th century, 
official brokers were in charge of creating such lists.80 
 
A complementary issue to this matching problem is that merchants pay search costs to find the best 
match. Buyers searching for a product incur travel costs, as well as costs to learn the prices and 
compare product characteristics. Seller search costs include finding the right buyers, as well as 
communication costs to promote their quality and type of goods.81 Furthermore, in an environment 
where time is limited by merchants’ travel (as they only stay in towns for a short time), the number 
of products is limited and re-selling is restricted, congestion in the transaction process can lead to 
sub-optimal matches. A merchant might decide not to inspect another seller’s offerings or to not 
wait for a more willing buyer because this increases the risk of losing a better deal or not selling 
anything because the potential trading partner completes the business transaction with somebody 
else. Thus, fewer matches are created than would be possible because some sellers and buyers 
cannot locate the quality or price match they need, even if such pairs exist. In addition, not all 
matches are efficient because some buyers would have been willing to pay a higher price and other 
sellers would have been willing to sell for a lower price.82 Such an environment can be for instance 
observed in wine markets, where buyers have to visit different wine cellars whose quality differs 
and amounts are limited, which makes comparison was costly, less transparent and not possible to 
do simultaneously. Some brokerage regulations for wine explain in detail how brokers should gather 
information about wine selling in different locations and guide buyers through wine cellars to 
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 Economists have shown that such a bilateral trading environment leads to inefficiency (Myerson and Satterthwaite 
1983). The problem only decreases with an increase in the market size (Gresik and Satterthwaite 1989). 
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 For instance, see the brokerage regulations from Frankfurt 1450: Bücher (1915, pp. 249ff.); 1685: Beyerbach (1818, 
pp.700ff.); from Cologne 1427: Stein (1895, II,  p.235); from Basel 1406: Schnell (1856, pp. 88-90); from 
Constance 1395: Feger (1955, p.156.), 1433: ibidem ( p. 114); from Breslau 1670: Heymann(1898, pp. 383f.); or 
from Leipzig 1689: Moltke(1939, pp.11f.) 
80
 For the evolution of price lists, see McCusker and Gravensteijn (1991); for specific regulations on the creation of 
such price lists by brokers during the 17th century, see for example, Hamburg or Amsterdam. 
81
 For a general discussion of search costs in economic models, see Spulber (1996). 
82
 For an economic discussion of this argument, see Roth (2008). Economists would now identify such allocation 
problems in heterogeneous specialist labor markets, where job market candidates are only available for a short time 
and often unique, efficient matching pairs can be created. However, medieval markets with heterogeneous non-
standardized products, re-selling restrictions, and travelling merchants with short stays in foreign cities created a 
similar environment. 
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support the searching and matching process.83 Thus, the significant statistical relationship between 
wine brokerage and matching might be explained by such allocation problems (beside the broad 
variety of wine offered on the market). 
 
Therefore, a specialized and better-informed broker can reduce search and bargaining costs and 
create market-clearing matches. This is beneficial to the merchant as long as the gains from trade 
exceed the matching fees and the broker has an incentive to create more efficient market-clearing 
matches through his information. Gelderblom (2013) shows that brokerage fees were indeed low 
compared to transaction prices. Boerner and Quint (2016) analyze the observed brokerage matching 
design in this sample and argue, based on a formal institutional analysis, that brokers have 
incentives to create market-clearing matches and welfare efficient allocations. This incentive is 
driven by the fact that brokers profited only from matching fees and could not participate in the 
business themselves to extract a surplus.84 Furthermore, Boerner and Quint (2016) show that 
brokerage design reduces the incentives of merchants and brokers to act strategically, which would 
reduce welfare gains. Consequently, the implementation of such forms of matchmaking by the town 
makes visiting the town more attractive to foreign merchants and participating more attractive to the 
local merchant because it improves the allocation and increases the surplus participation of the 
merchant. This can increase ex ante incentives to invest in trade activities due to higher expected 
profits. (In contrast, if a merchant does not expect to participate in the surplus division, he has no 
incentives to invest in trade or to visit the market town.) 
 
Having derived such welfare-improving effects of the implementation of official brokers to function 
as matchmakers, we need to ask whether private intermediaries (matchmakers or market makers) 
could have achieved the same effects.  
 
Economic policy in the Middle Ages was commonly concerned that powerful intermediaries could 
interfere in demand and supply (Hibbert 1967). Assuming strong information asymmetry and the 
potential economic and political power of some local merchants, such interference could have led to 
collusion, monopoly power and surplus extraction of a few. In addition to the frequently 
documented fear of official brokers doing so, evidence from market regulations exists that private 
intermediaries tried to buy up products before they passed town gates, entered harbors, or markets 
opened. Only after the market had cleared were private intermediaries allowed to buy leftovers. 
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 For example see the orders from Constance 1542: Kimmig and Ruester (1954, pp. 182ff.) or Heilbronn 1500: Jäger 
(1828, p. 146). 
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 This result also holds if merchants are forced to transact via a broker, as discussed in the next paragraph. 
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These actions were forbidden for everybody and harshly punished.85 Consequently, the power of 
some private intermediaries could have easily destroyed welfare gains. Furthermore, the 
implementation of official intermediaries could have been useful in markets with temporary 
shortages, such as wood, or where weak transparency was likely, as in wine markets. Such incentive 
problems might have decreased during the early modern period when increases in population, 
markets, and trade flows created sufficiently thick markets and reduced information asymmetry. 
Indeed, during the 17th century, a critical number of unofficial but partly tolerated private 
intermediaries existed in growing cities, such as Amsterdam, Hamburg, Leipzig, or Nuremberg, and 
were engaged in documented brokerage activities.86  
 
Finding the right type of good might be difficult because buyers are not able to determine the true 
quality of the goods. The existence of such information asymmetry and strategic use has been 
outlined in brokerage regulations reminding official brokers not to certify low-quality goods as high 
quality. Such information asymmetry can create incentives for sellers to offer low-quality goods at 
premium prices by advertising them as high quality. A buyer who expects such behavior is not 
willing to pay for high-quality goods. Thus, merchants of high-quality goods cannot sell anything 
and in turn stop coming to the town or producing this type of good even though there are people 
who would buy them.87 Such information asymmetry thus creates welfare losses. The same is true 
when sellers would like to sell on credit but too many low-quality debtors exist; the inability to 
differentiate good from bad creditors reduces credit, and fewer transactions are executed. The 
introduction of a broker who is an expert in product quality and creditworthiness can solve this 
problem. If he is able and willing to reveal this information for a small fee, real gains in quality 
based on product differentiation can be achieved, and the benefits of credit markets can be realized. 
The implementation of brokers who certified creditworthiness is reported for high-value products. 
Thus, assuming that wholesale or high-value product trade relied on credit, the introduction of an 
intermediary occurred where it created the largest gains. Product quality certification played a role 
in consumable products, where quality was crucial; consider, for example, the statistically 
significant relationship for the fish, cattle and meat, and wine and beer categories. The second 
significant group of products is construction materials. Here, a shortage of high-quality wood, 
which was critical for building houses and ships, might have been an issue. Thus, sellers could have 
had incentives to sell poor-quality goods at premium prices. 
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  For Cologne’s grain markets, see Kuske (1917, II p.334, 338); poultry: Ibidem, (p.467f.) wine: Ibidem, (p. 822f.). 
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 For Amsterdam: Noordkerk (1748, vol.2, pp.1060-3); Hamburg: Beukemann (1912, pp.545-61); Leipzig: Moltke 
(1939, p.14f.), Nuremberg: Roth (1802, p.338). 
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 This scenario is modeled in the well-known market for lemons paper by Akerlof (1970) describing a used car 
market. 
24 
 
 
We can ask again why cities had to intervene and appoint official brokers as certifiers for product 
quality. Economists argue that the incentives should come from the suppliers of high-quality 
products (Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981).88 Indeed, is there evidence that traders created brands 
for their products. However, with branding came imitation (Kaiser 1987). Thus, buyers still needed 
experts who could distinguish originals from imitations. Furthermore, having both vertically and 
horizontally differentiated products and heterogeneity of tastes makes it difficult to establish 
common quality standards (Harbaugh et al., 2011). Alternatively, we might expect private certifiers. 
However, we do not observe the existence of such private agents. One problem is that such agents 
would have conflicts of interest: A problem identified in the literature on contemporary markets is 
that sellers can shop for certifiers who are willing to assign high rankings to their products, creating 
incentives for the certifiers inflate their ratings to obtain future business. On the contrary, reputation 
mechanisms on the certifier and buyer sides are hard to achieve because buyers are less informed 
about product quality and/or may learn slowly (Bolton, et al. 2012; Mathis et al. 2012). 
Consequently, having an official certifier who is under the control of the town might be a more 
efficient solution. 
 
Having outlined the welfare-improving effects of brokerage as a matchmaking and certification 
function, we must now discuss whether brokerage was a rent-seeking institution. Following Tullok 
(1967) and Krueger (1974), such an institution extracts rents with the help of political power 
without being productive.  
 
The collection of taxes is one candidate for rent seeking. Indeed, we find that this task is quite 
frequently mentioned in specific regulations,89 appearing in some regions more frequently than in 
others. However, rent seeking assumes that collected payments go into the pockets of private 
persons and that merchants do not benefit from any public goods provided by the town, for instance, 
in the form of infrastructure or legal security. Examining the allocation and distribution of taxes and 
fees in general and of brokerage in particular is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Whether the payment of brokerage fees by buyers and sellers for matchmaking or certification 
activities can be considered rent seeking has not yet been discussed. Neither the use of brokers nor 
the payment of their fees was usually required; moreover, the fees were low and related to welfare 
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 However, this is costly only after a certain threshold value. See Grossman and Hart (1980). 
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 However, we only observe the exclusive use of brokerage as a taxation device in two towns, Heidelberg and Kassel, 
both of which were primarily residential rather than trading towns. 
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improving activities. Thus, demanding these fees could not have reflected rent-seeking activity. 
However, we find evidence in a few prominent merchant towns that foreigners were forced to use 
brokers. For example, in Brugge, such regulations are documented from the 13th to the 15th 
centuries. Only a few merchants were granted exemptions (Gilliodt van Severen 1881). In an 
examination of Brugge, Gelderblom (2013) argues that this was not a serious problem because there 
were only a few minor complaints, probably because fees were low and merchants received 
matching services. In addition, because in Brugge many brokers were also hostellers, this was an 
integral part of the transaction process for merchants.  
 
Furthermore, we can document cases such as Cologne for which temporary forced use of brokerage 
occurred for select products either for everybody,90 or only for foreigners.91 In these cases, rent-
seeking activities (based on the political power of some brokers) are possible. However, forced 
brokerage policies might also be motivated by the desire to monitor the allocation process, for 
instance, to control scarce products, as in the wood market of Cologne. Finally, in some earlier 
regulations, brokers were not allowed to arrange deals between foreigners,92 to arrange only a 
limited amount,93 or to arrange them only after a set period.94 However, such regulations are rather 
restrictive profit-seeking than rent-seeking devices.95 
 
Following this economic interpretation of the observed brokerage regulations, we can derive some 
interesting insights into the evolution of the business environment and the market microstructure. 
The emphasis on different institutional mechanisms at different periods might reflect different types 
of information asymmetry. The earlier role of brokers as official matchmakers can be explained by a 
need to find the right trading partners. Once trade flows have been established and institutionalized, 
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 For example, see the regulations of Frankfurt 1380 for hay: Buecher (1915, pp. 225f.); Dordrecht 1401 for wine: 
Fruin (1882, I, pp. 35ff.); Constance 1526 for cloth and fustian: Kimmig and Ruester (1954, p. 91). 
91
 For example see the regulations for Constance 1508 for wine: Kimmig and Ruester (1954, p.85), for Frankfurt 1381 
for wine only if the deal was done outside a wine cellar: Buecher (1915, p.326ff.). 
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 See Bruinswick 1320: Hänselmann (1900, II, pp.516f.); Hannover 1360: Fiedeler (1876, p.79); Greifswald 1433: 
Pommersche Jahrbücher (1901, pp. 119ff.); Danzig ca. 1460: Simson (1904, pp.42f.) The only later rules w.r.t. this 
type of regulations are from Hamburg 1589, 1606, and 1642: Beukemann 1912, pp. 541-5. However, in the frequent 
regulations from the second half of the 17th century, such regulations have disappeared.  
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 See the regulations on wine brokerage in Frankfurt 1349: Wolf (1969, pp.84ff.), 1350, 1351: Bücher (1915, pp. 
323ff.), 1381: ibidem (pp. 326ff.). Here, except during fairs, brokers could intermediate only limited amounts of 
goods between foreigners. 
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 See the regulations from Luebeck 1410: Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck (1858, Vol. 2, p. 765) and Leipzig 1464: 
Moltke (1939, p. 6). 
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 Such constraints do not affect the broker’s incentives to create market-clearing matches given the matching options 
available (under the assumption that the broker acts as a matchmaker as described in the large number of brokerage 
regulations documented). However, they may have affected clearing efficiency because in a larger set of potential 
buyers and sellers, a foreigner might have been willing to offer a higher buying price or lower selling price for a 
given level of product quality. For some matching pairs, such constraints might have created a higher share of the 
surplus for the local merchants than would have been generated by trade. 
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a broker is not needed as a matchmaker. However, with the growth of trade volumes (often related 
to a need for the inspection of product samples) and an increase in the variety of products, the 
demand for brokers as certifiers increases. Finally, the later use of brokers as verifiers of buyer 
creditworthiness implies the development of a more prominent credit market and the creation of 
new types of information asymmetry. Over time, this is consistent with more frequent observations 
of brokers for financial instruments. In addition to to this time dimension, we can identify the 
importance of different forms of regulation for specific product types, which clarifies the 
differentiated information structures of business environments.  
 
 
5. Further discussion 
 
Analyzing different brokerage mechanisms is interesting, but it is important to understand these 
mechanisms within a more complete frame of medieval markets and market mechanisms. We 
cannot do this here for the whole sample, but we can more closely examine the city of Cologne. 
 
We identified matchmaking as the main brokerage function. Alternatively, medieval spot markets 
where buyers and sellers meet at a specific place and time might also solve matchmaking problems. 
Spot markets can be housed in open-air markets, halls or warehouses. Such markets have been 
regularly documented. Spot markets aggregate demand and supply and thus also aggregate 
information, create transparency, and reduce strategic behavior if the market is sufficiently large and 
homogeneous. These features can also reduce search, match, and bargaining costs. For some types 
of products, these markets were also subject to staple rights, which forced foreign merchants to 
display and offer their products for a designated number of days before moving on (Kuske 1939). 
 
Let us analyze how brokerage of the main product types identified relates to organized spot markets 
in Late Medieval Cologne. We can distinguish three categories: 1) brokerage where no spot markets 
can be found; 2) brokerage as a complementary function in an organized spot market; and 3) 
brokerage as an alternative form that parallels a spot market.  
 
The first category of products for which we cannot find centralized spot market includes houses and 
property, financial products, and wine. The missing spot market for houses and property can be 
easily explained by the lack of transportability of these products. Thus, real estate brokers are 
needed for matchmaking. Cologne had an emerging market for financial products. By the Late 
Middle Ages, a differentiated rent system had developed and a growing market was documented 
(Kuske 1956, pp. 99ff.; Schönfelder 1970, pp. 63ff.). Furthermore, bills of exchange were regularly 
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used (Kuske 1956, pp. 96f.), and gold and silver coins were used as currency (Kuske 1956, pp. 
170ff.). 
 
However, we do not find all-encompassing centralized markets for these products. The first 
attempts to establish exchanges date to the late 16th century, when merchants asked the town to 
provide a space where they could meet informally to conduct business (Helten 1923). At the time, 
the only central place was used by money changers (Keussen 1910, Tafel II). Before the 14th 
century, Lombard houses existed and were possibly locations for more concentrated financial 
transactions (Kuske 1956). 
 
The reason for such missing markets might lie in their developing character. Financial instruments 
were generally not tradable until the late 16th century. Thus, this market was rather heterogeneous 
and thin, and using a broker was a more flexible and convenient choice. Furthermore, credit markets 
related to merchants and wholesale markets for consumption products were organized alongside the 
product transactions. For instance, the cattle market was accompanied by the so-called Viehtafel, an 
institution where credit and bills of exchange related to the cattle trade were issued (Kuske 1903, 
pp. 99). Thus, the separation of the good from the financial market had not yet taken place.96 
 
Cologne had one of the largest wholesale wine markets in the region (Herbron and Militzer 1980; 
Uytven 1965). The steady documentation of wine brokers fits very well into this picture. However, 
there is no evidence of a centralized marketplace or warehouse for the clearing of wine barrels. 
Kuske (1903, p. 109) argued that wine had to be quickly unloaded and brought to wine cellars; 
otherwise, it would have affected the quality of the wine. Therefore, building a warehouse or spot 
market for wine would not have been helpful. Brokers who showed buyers around different wine 
cellars adequately identified matches, thus precluding the formation of a central marketplace. In 
addition, many local wholesalers imported wine from wine-growing areas. Therefore, a market that 
served importers and local wholesalers was a less acute need (Herbron and Militzer 1980; Uytven 
1965). 
 
In the second category of products, the brokerage function was nested within a centralized spot 
market. This category includes wholesale products that were traded in warehouses (Kuske 1903, pp, 
122ff.). In the warehouse at the Alte Markt (old market), later known as the Leinenkaufhaus (linen 
warehouse), linen, yarn, foreign cloth, fur, leather, and various metals were traded during the 14th 
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 However, at least since the 17th century, bills of exchange from the cattle market in Cologne were traded in 
Amsterdam (Kuske 1903, p.99). 
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century. This was the only place where these goods could be sold. Brokers assigned to different 
products had to be present during the warehouse opening hours and had to serve the merchants if 
they were needed. During the 15th century, some were transferred to another warehouse due to a 
lack of space, but the clearing mechanism stayed the same. Thus, we find centralized spot market 
housed in warehouses with complementary brokers.97  
 
Similarly, a second large warehouse, the Malzbüchel, which was founded at the end of the 14th 
century, housed trade in spices, dyes and different types of metals, and the corresponding brokers 
were required to be there. Interestingly, we find the first brokerage regulations for spices around the 
same time as the foundation of this warehouse. There is some evidence that in the Domwage (the 
weighing house at the cathedral), spices were already being traded in the 14th century without 
participating brokers. It seems that with an upswing of trade, more structured clearing was 
organized. Furthermore, there is evidence that oil, fat, and butter were also traded in this warehouse 
during the 16th century. Whereas butter and fat had previously been traded in the fish warehouse, oil 
cannot be clearly traced back to any other central facility (Kuske 1911, pp. 40f.). Brokerage for 
these types of products can be found beginning in the late 15th century. If the brokerage activities 
were related to warehouse activities, this cannot be fully derived from the sources, but can be 
assumed because these products were also not allowed to be sold elsewhere.  
More evidence of this type of complementary structure of spot markets and brokerage can be found 
for the food market. By 1426, a fish warehouse had been established (Kuske 1905, pp.288ff.), and 
all wholesale activities had to take place there. We find fish broker regulations from 1450, which 
pertain mainly to the warehouse. In addition, the brokers had to supervise retail fish markets. Before 
the 15th century, the wholesale market was probably the open fish market where retail sales also 
took place.98 Another centralized market was the weekly (and annual) cattle market (Kuske 1903, 
pp. 95ff.). On this market, butchers, and sometimes private sellers, bought cattle for slaughter. This 
was the only market where trade was allowed. We have evidence of this market from the early 15th 
century. The presence of brokers, who had to be present while the market was open to offer their 
services, has been documented regularly since 1450. Grain was also sold at several centralized 
markets in town. The few brokerage regulations indicate that they were used, but it seems that there 
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 This pattern might also shed light on the significant relationship between the matchmaking function and warehoused 
products. The explanation is related to the appearance of complementary institutions. However, in this case, the use 
of warehouses per se still needs to be explained, which can also be linked to the improvement of the allocation 
mechanism related to the arguments outlined in section 4. 
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 Another group of goods, oil, fat, and butter, was traded in the fish warehouses and later transferred to the 
“Gürzenich” warehouse (Kuske 1911). Over the same period, brokers are mentioned but regulations do not refer to 
warehouse. However, the source material indicates that all these products had to be traded in warehouses, and we 
can infer that these brokers also provided intermediation in the warehouses. Thus, these brokers belonged to the 
third group.  
29 
 
was little need for grain brokers at this grain markets (Kuske 1903, pp. 103ff.). 
 
Finally, the third category includes brokers operating beside spot markets. For example, a horse 
market was held at the Neue Markt (new market) once a week. However, horse trading was not 
restricted to this market, and deals could take place elsewhere in town (Kuske 1903, p. 118.). The 
market for wool was less organized. There was a central selling house for wool, the Wollküche, but 
wool could also be traded in homes (Kuske 1903, pp. 131ff). We can document wool broker 
regulations, but cannot link them to a centralized spot market. Furthermore, for construction 
materials, such as wood or bricks, we find partly centralized markets with brokers. However, some 
wood was directly sold from ships because merchants faced logistical challenges in transporting 
their goods to the market. Thus, in addition to their activities on spot markets, brokers were engaged 
in intermediation in markets beside the ships (Kuske 1903, pp. 112ff.). 
 
Having discussed the markets for which we could identify brokerage most frequently, we can ask 
whether any important wholesale market remain for which we do not find brokerage but do find 
spot markets. 
We know of a large centralized coal market in Cologne, (Kuske 1903pp. 105ff.), but no coal brokers 
can be found. We also find evidence that coal sales could be decentralized after the central market.  
 
The second and third functions we found are quality control and tax collection. Again, we can ask 
whether other institutions performed these functions. In Cologne, we find a whole group of 
officials, who measured, weighed or simply counted goods that were for sale. Such controls were 
motivated by tax collection. The literature also clearly shows that taxes had been collected since the 
14th century for all these products (Kuske 1914; Schönfelder 1970). However, such measuring 
procedures also helped to reveal product quality because officials verified the accuracy of the 
declared amounts and quality by opening packaging. Furthermore, because products of varying 
quality and size had different tax values, the controls revealed a basic product differentiation related 
to quality. This measurement and weighing can be found for most product types on the Cologne 
market, although we do not find that officials regulate horses, finance, or property sales.  
Naturally, the next question is how these tasks differed from the quality inspection provided by the 
brokers we could assign to Cologne. There are two ways to differentiate their tasks and to explain 
their co-existence. One is the more sophisticated quality control task of the broker. For example, 
whereas a wine broker needed to taste wines to assess their quality, a wine controller (Weinröder) 
merely counted the barrels and checked whether and how much of a certain type of wine was 
present in a barrel (Kuske 1914, p. 22). A fish broker had to inspect fish in detail to judge whether it 
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was fit to consume, while other fish inspectors (for instance, the Heringröder) only opened herring 
barrels to check the amount, type and declared origin of the goods before sending them on to the 
market or warehouse (Kuske 1905; 1914, pp. 46ff.). For spices, the broker needed to have 
differentiated expertise. Again, the complementary inspector (the Siebknecht) only checked the 
general content (Kuske 1914, pp. 69ff.).  
A second explanation could lie in the decentralized trading of some goods, such as construction 
material (Kuske1914, pp. 19ff.) or for horses where no complementary controller can be found in 
the historical sources. Thus, in this case the broker steps in and inspects the goods. 
Furthermore, we can ask whether other institutions also checked buyers' creditworthiness. From the 
literature, we can only identify one institution, the so-called Viehtafel, where town officials related 
to the cattle trade checked buyers' creditworthiness and allocated credits for buyers and, later, 
specific bills of exchange, which were also traded in 16th century Amsterdam (Kuske 1956, pp. 
80f.). 
Finally, could these officials have offered brokerage services? Kuske (1914, p. 60f.) speculates on 
the role of Kornmüdder (inspectors who measured grain), and finds some evidence from the late 
16th until the early 18th century. Furthermore, he finds a source indicating that Kalkmüdder (who 
measured limestone) in the 18th century were involved in intermediation. Whereas the market for 
lime is marginal during our investigation period, the observations for the grain market are of some 
interest because we do not find many sources on grain brokerage in Cologne, perhaps due to the fact 
that these grain measurers did indeed provide brokerage. However, we find scant evidence of an 
either official obligation or occasional brokerage activities in the sources. What can be documented 
from these sources is that these inspectors and measurers also tried to use their positions to engage 
in private business, which was strictly forbidden by the town of Cologne. 
 Thus, from this study of the market microstructure of Cologne, we can conclude that brokers 
indeed played a prominent matchmaking role in most markets. However, their complementary role 
in spot markets and warehouses must also be taken into account. With regards to quality control, we 
see that different types of quality control were at work. Thus, we might ask whether a subsequent 
study might more precisely describe the interplay of brokers and other officials who counted, 
measured, and weighed products. Judging the role and importance of brokers in establishing the 
creditworthiness of buyers based on this case study of Cologne is difficult. It seems that such 
institutions and corresponding credit markets for purchasing goods were just developing. In 
addition, we speculate that specialized financial markets were developing to serve these needs and 
that financial intermediaries and brokers were important. Finally, from this study of Cologne, it 
becomes clear that tax collection was organized differently and was not the main purpose of 
brokers, at least in a city as large as Cologne. Thus, our study (in which this function is correlated 
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with small populations), suggests that in other large cities, such functions were also performed by 
other town officials. It is worth considering the interplay between brokers and other tax collectors. 
For instance, during the late 16th century, fish brokers in Cologne had to report their deals to the 
excise tax collectors who then reacted and levied taxes accordingly (Kuske 1905, p. 294). 
 
6. Other issues 
Let me conclude by discussing other aspects of brokerage policy that have been discussed in the 
literature and upon which this investigation could shed more light. 
One interesting debate is about the role of innkeepers as intermediaries during the study period. 
Considering the heydays of Brugge, Antwerp, and Amsterdam chronologically, Gelderblom (2013) 
notes the declining importance of innkeepers as brokers. Whereas in 14th and 15th century Brugge, 
an important share of brokers were also innkeepers, he notices a decline of this dual function in 
Antwerp during the 16th century and even a temporary ban on innkeepers and other private persons 
working as brokers in Amsterdam. Gelderblom attributes this decline to a reduced need for 
hostellers due to alternative accommodation possibilities for merchants (e.g., rented or bought 
houses for all merchant groups from a town or region), which allowed the division of these two 
services. Such a dynamic might indicate an early natural link of the brokerage business to the 
hosteller function (Ehrenberg 1885). Furthermore, the brokerage regulations of Brugge and 
Antwerp reveal tension between the rights of innkeepers to work as brokers and those of 
intermediaries who worked only as brokers. Based on these and other observations, van Houtten 
(1936, pp. 134ff.) identifies two types of brokerage policies in late medieval cities. On the one 
hand, towns such as Brugge or Antwerp gave innkeepers brokerage privilege. On the other hand, 
some towns prohibited this double function and allowed only brokers to work as intermediaries. As 
van Houtten explains, this policy was means of creating an economic balance between these 
professions by allocating the profits obtained from merchants to brokerage fees for the broker and 
accommodation fees for the innkeepers. 
However, the investigated brokerage regulations and identified policy intentions indicate that such a 
restriction is also meaningful if towns wanted to prevent the private business activities or strategic 
behaviors of brokers on behalf of one market participant. Allowing a customer and a broker to sleep 
under the same roof creates less transparent business activities and potentially conceals such 
behavior. The policies identified in our analysis to allow brokers work only as matchmakers might 
have been reactions to the declining need for hostellers and their subsequently reduced economic 
and political power, which allowed towns to restrict intermediation by private persons, particularly 
innkeepers (who were natural first candidate for foreign merchant intermediation). 
An analysis of our sample supports such a conclusion. The dual function of hostellers and brokers 
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(as reflected in brokerage regulations) is observed mainly in prosperous Belgian towns starting in 
the late 13th century.99 Such privileges indeed indicate an early (natural) connection between the 
hosteller and brokerage businesses (Ehrenberg 1885), as well as the economic and political clout of 
hostellers. The evidence for early 15th century Cologne indicates the early existence of this dual 
function, but brokers were later barred from being hostellers, and vice versa. Such restrictions have 
been documented since the middle of the 14th century in many towns in other areas. For example, 
we find such regulations for Frankfurt during the 14th and 15th centuries.100 However, we do not find 
such observations there in the 16th or 17th centuries, which might indicate an earlier, traditional link 
between these professions followed by a separation policy leading to the subsequent a 
disappearance of such incentive problems and related policy interests. 
Another discussion revolves around the role and importance of brokers as official certifiers or 
impartial authenticators of deals (Laband 1861; Goldschmidt 1882). This debate is again related to 
the origin of brokerage, which might have been the need for local official intermediaries to provide 
legal support for foreign merchants (who only had limited rights) in any disputes or disagreements 
among merchants that ended up in local courts.  
Our sample indicates that such obligations were documented rather infrequently during the early 
period. However, they can be found in prominent trade cities, such as Brugge, Luebeck, Cologne or 
Basel during the 15th century (Gilliodt van Severen 1881; Pauli 1847, p. 226ff., 1420: Stein II, 
p.129f., Schnell 1856, pp. 88ff).101 In Brugge and Luebeck, we find a bookkeeping obligation 
related to a duty of disclosure in court. Such a task is frequently documented beginning in the 16th 
and especially in the 17th centuries, when brokers are reminded to record the quantity, quality, and 
price of a deal; this obligation often also required them to keep a product sample.102 These 
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 Regulations that explicitly mention this dual function are Antwerp, Brugge, Brussels, and Antwerp; see van Houtten 
(1936), pp.134f. Beyond these observations, no additional evidence for other cities was found in the brokerage 
sample of this study.  
100
 For Frankfurt in 1357: Wolf (1969, pp. 111f.); 1373: Buecher (1915, p. 248, pp.325f.); 1381: Ibidem (pp. 326ff.); 
1425, and 1490: ibidem (pp.303ff). More similar regulations can be found in Wismar 1339: Mecklenburgisches 
Urkundenbuch (1884, vol. XIII, N. 7766 § 10); Würzburg 1387: Hoffmann (1955, p.80); Greifswald 1413: 
Pommersche Jahrbücher (1901, II, pp. 119ff.), Basel 1406: Geering (1886, p. 156). For these cities, we find no later 
regulations related to this topic. However, we find later evidence in Danzig 1597: Simson (1904), p. 125, and 
Hamburg 1642: Beukemann (1912) pp. 542ff, 1654: Ibidem (545ff.), 1673: Ibidem (550ff.) 1679 and 1692: ibidem 
(555ff.) Breslau1670: Heymann (1898, pp.383f.) All these cities have more pronounced brokerage regulations 
beginning in the 16th century, with the upswings of their economies. Thus, this pattern indicates time-lagged 
implementation of brokerage policies, as described in the previous set of towns. 
101A brokerage document from Frankfurt 1496 says that a broker should speak in court, but the reason is not clear.  
     Bücher (1915, pp. 245-247). Two sources from Posen indicate the same, 1501:                                                            
      Warschauer (1892, p.292); 1502: Ibidem (p.301).  
102
 We find evidence in Frankfurt 1415: Bücher (1915, p.242); 1616: Schubert (1962, p.80); 1626 Beyerbach (1818, pp. 
840-846); 1685: Ibidem (pp.700ff.); Amsterdam 1539: Dillen (1929, 139ff.); 1579: ibidem (pp. 406ff.), 1612: 
Noordkerk (1748, II, pp. 1060ff.); Augsburg 1549: Stadtarchiv Augsburg (Unterkäuferakten I); Bremen 1626, 1640: 
Akten Staatsarchiv Bremen, 1650: Blaum (1977, pp. 109ff.), Hamburg 1642: Beukemann (1912, pp. 542ff.), 1654: 
ibidem (545ff.), 1673: ibidem (550ff.), 1679 and 1692: ibidem (555ff.); Leipzig 1614: Moltke (1939, p. 11f.) and 
1681: ididem (p.24). 
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documents do not reveal any direct links to information disclosures in court. However, beside tax 
collection purposes, such information collection seems convincing only for this type of record 
keeping. 
These observations suggest that such a brokerage obligation developed over time and grew more 
important with increasing trade activities, when trade was based on samples without having 
inspected all the products, when product delivery occurred later, and potentially when some of the 
merchants were absent during the deal. Such developments are in line with a more prominent role 
for brokers as product certifiers and verifiers of creditworthiness on the demand side, which address 
similar types of information asymmetry. 
Finally, a third topic of interest is the organization of brokers. Some scholars have found the 
development of powerful brokerage guilds, the most notable examples of which are in Brugge (van 
Houtten 1950) and Amsterdam (van Malsen 1933). Such observations would be consistent with the 
reported ubiquitous presence of guild institutions in pre-modern economic production and political 
decision-making processes. Thus, consider whether guilds played an important role in the 
organization of official intermediation activities.  
Based on our sample, we find guild structures in Belgium and the Netherlands.103 However, more 
generally (i.e., in these as well as other cities), we find evidence that towns directly organized 
broker behavior through brokerage regulations, often organizing them cooperatively. Quite 
frequently, regulations indicate that brokers should not compete104 and that they should share the 
income they generate.105 However, it is also written (sometimes in the same rules and in the same 
towns) that they should not work in groups or work only in groups of two.106 Thus, towns seemed to 
walk a brokerage policy tightrope. The cooperative element is directly related to the fear that 
                                                 
103
 In Brugge, from the 14th through the 16th centuries, Gilliodts- van Severen (1881); van Houte (1950); in Brussels 
1385: Des Marez (1904, pp. 345f.); in Antwerp 1437: Dillis (1910, pp. 310ff, 418-422), in Middleburgh 1545: Pols 
(1888, pp 487f.), Amsterdam beginning in 1578/9: Stuart (1879, pp.41ff.), Dillen (1929, pp.407-409).  
104
 We find evidence for Antwerp during the 15th and 17th centuries, for example, in 1412: Dillis (1910, pp. 413-417); in 
Amsterdam during the 16th century, for example, in 1579; in Cologne during the 15th century, for example, in 1498: 
Kuske (1917, vol. II, pp. 778-9); in Dordrecht in 1401: Fruin (1882, I, pp. 35-7); in Frankfurt during the 14th, 15th 
and 17th centuries, for example, in 1437: Bücher (1915, pp. 239f.); in Hamburg during the 17th century, for example, 
in 1654; Beukemann (1912, pp. 545-9), in Hoorn in 1565: Pols (1888, 163ff.); in Middleburg in 1449: ibidem 
(p.122); and in Strasbourg in 1354: Toebelmann (1911) p. 161.  
105
 We find complementary evidence for the already mentioned no-competition regulations (see previous footnote) from 
Antwerp, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and Hoorn and more evidence for different regulations in the same cities and 
periods in Strassbourg during the 14th and 15th centuries, for example, in 1490: Schmoller (1897, pp.24, 64f.) 
Toebelmann (1911, p.162). Evidence also exists for other cities, such as Colmar in 1379: Waldner (1907, p.33); 
Danzig in 1597: Simson (1904, p. 125); Constance during from the 14th to the 16th centuries, for example, in 1460 
(Feger 1955, pp.116f.); in Leipzig from the late 15th to the 17th centuries, for example, in 1499: Moltke(1939, p.9); 
and in Würzburg in 1474: Hoffmann (1955) p. 323. 
106
 We find evidence for the same regulations (as noted in the previous footnote) for Antwerp (1437), Dordrecht (1401), 
Strassbourg (1490), Cologne (1498), and Hamburg (1654); for some cities, we find change (and introductions) over 
time; in Amsterdam, for example, 1612: Noordkerk (1748, pp.1060ff.), in Middleburg 1570: Pols (1888, pp. 793ff.); 
and during the same period, for in Strassbourg during the 14th and 15th centuries (see previously quoted sources). 
Other cities include Brugge in the 14th century; for example, regulations from 1303 limit the number of cooperative 
brokers to two, as in Enkhuizen 1637: Heijder (1979, p. 24) and Ulm 1522: Nübling (1890, p. 123). 
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brokers were working against each other in competing for customers. Such behavior would not have 
been in the interest of a town wishing to maximize welfare. Why is this so? The matching design 
gives the broker incentives (via brokerage fees) to use information to create market-clearing 
matches.107 Competition among brokers reduces their willingness to reveal and share information, 
which reduces the quality of the matches due to incomplete information. The wine brokerage 
regulations from Colmar in 1379, for instance, mention an information-sharing obligation (Waldner 
1907, p.33). We might then ask is why only small groups of brokers were allowed to work together: 
one answer is fear of collusion. A strong cooperative form might create incentives to violate 
prohibitions on private business, whereas independent brokers might better control each other’s 
actions. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has examined market policies in the form of brokerage regulations in late medieval and 
early modern Central and Western Europe from 1250 to 1700 based on a sample of 70 towns. The 
paper has identified brokerage as a trade-supporting mechanism implemented by town officials. 
Brokers were instrumental in matching buyers and sellers, offered quality certification services for 
products and provided creditor certification services for customers who bought goods on credit. 
Furthermore, brokers collected taxes for local governments. Whether tax collection was performed 
to provide merchants and citizens with public goods or whether it served rent-seeking purposes 
cannot be determined by this study. 
 
This empirical investigation has shown that all three types of brokerage functions were applied 
individually as well as in combination in individual regulations. The most frequent combination 
observed was matchmaking and certification. Furthermore, we found period, geographic and 
product-specific variations in the regulations. The matchmaking function was documented more 
frequently and earlier than the certification function. Trade-supporting institutions were found along 
the most important trade routes. In addition, brokerage regulations for specific products correlated 
with the trade routes for those products. Finally, different brokerage designs were related to 
different product types.  
 
To provide a more holistic perspective on brokerage institutions, we examine the case study of 
Cologne to inspect individual brokerage regulations and investigate how brokerage interacted with 
other market institutions. We found that brokerage indeed played a prominent role in the allocation 
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  For the formal argument, see Boerner and Quint (2016). 
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process. However, we also noted that brokerage complemented or replaced other mechanisms. 
 
These results allow us to identify specific information and allocation problems during particular 
periods, regions, and product markets reflected in the institutional designs observed. In addition, the 
empirical observations enable us to shed light on the importance of formal market institutions in 
general during the period under investigation. Based on the economic analysis and interpretation, 
the correlations between regulations and trade characteristics suggest that such formal institutions 
must have been important for the growth and development of merchant cities. However, an 
empirical exercise that shows formal causation is left for future study. Finally, an examination of the 
interplay between these formal regulations and the daily business activities of brokers, as observed 
in complementary sources, would be of considerable interest but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
References 
 
Akerlof, George A., 1970. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3), 488-500. 
 
Akten des Staatsarchivs Bremen, 2-Ss.1.A.1.b. 
 
Bairoch, Paul, 1988. Cities and Economic Development, from the Dawn of History to the Present,  
Chicago: University Press. 
 
Bairoch, Paul, Jean Batou, and Piere Chevre, 1988. La Population des villes Europeennes, banque  
des donnees et analyse sommaire des resultats: 800-1850, Geneva: Droz. 
 
Below, Stefan von and Stefan Breit, 1998. Wald von der Gottesgabe zum Privateigentum. Stuttgart: 
Lucius & Lucius. 
 
Beukemann, Friedrich, 1912. Die Geschichte des Hamburger Mäklerrechts, Heidelberg: Carl 
Winter. 
 
Beyerbach, Johann Conrad, 1818. Sammlung der Verordnungen der Reichsstadt Frankfurt: 
Frankfurt a. M.. 
 
Boerner, Lars, and Oliver Volckart, 2011. The utility of a common coinage: Currency unions and 
the integration of money markets in late Medieval Central Europe. Explorations in Economic 
History 48(1), 53-65. 
 
Bolton, Patrick, Xavier Freixas and Joel Shapiro, 2012. The Credit Ratings Game. Journal of 
Finance 67(1), 85-112. 
 
Blaum, Franz Thomas, 1978. Die Entwicklung des Maklerwesens in Bremen von den Anfaengen 
bis zur Freigabe des Amtes. Dissertation. Kiel. 
 
36 
 
Blendinger, Friedrich (ed.), 1994. Zwei Augsburger Unterkaufbücher aus den Jahren 1551 bis 1558: 
älteste Aufzeichnungen zur Vor- und Frühgeschichte der Augsburger Börse. Stuttgart: Steiner. 
 
Brandt, Ahasver von, 1954. Waren- und Geldhandel um 1560, Aus dem Geschäftsbuch des 
Lübecker Maklers Steffen Molousen, Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte 34, 45-57. 
 
Buecher, Karl (ed.), 1915. Frankfurter Amts- und Zunfturkunden bis zum Jahre 1612, Frankfurt a. 
M.: Baer. 
 
Cantoni, Davide and Noam Yuchtman, 2014. Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the 
Commerical Revolution. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 (2), pp. 823-887. 
 
Commerzbibliothek Hamburg, Stiftung Hanseatisches Wirtschaftsarchiv S/526. (Maklerwesen, 
Diverses Sammelmappe). 
 
Davis, James, 2011. Medieval Market Morality: Life Law, and Ethics in the English Market Place, 
1200-1500. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Des Marez, Guillaume, 1904. L'Organisation du Travail A Bruxelles Au XVe Siecle, Bruxelles: 
Hayez. 
 
Dijkman, Jessica, 2011. Shaping Medieval Markets, The Organisation of Medieval Commodity 
Markets in Holland, c.1200- c.1450. Leiden: Brill. 
 
Dillen van, J. G. (Ed.), 1929. Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van het Bedrijfsleven en het Gildewezen 
van Amsterdam, Eerste Deel 1512-1611, S Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Dilis, E., 1910, Les Courtiers anversois sous l'ancien regime, Annales de l'Academie Royale 
d'Archeologie de Belgique LXII, 299-462. 
 
Dollinger, Philippe, 1966. Die Hanse, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag. 
 
Ehrenberg, Richard,1885. Makler, Hosteliers und Börse, vom 13. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert, 
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht 30, Stuttgart, 403-468 
 
Epstein, Stephan R., 1998. Craft guilds, apprenticeships, and technological change in pre-industrial 
Europe. Journal of Economic History 58(3), 684-713. 
 
Epstein, Stephan R., 2008. Craft Guilds in the pre-modern economy: a discussion. The Economic 
History Review 61(1), 155- 174. 
 
Feger, Otto, 1955. Vom Richtebrief zum Roten Buch: die ältere Konstanzer Ratsgesetzgebung, 
Konstanz: Thorbecke. 
 
Fiedeler, G. J.,1876.  Mittheilungen aus dem alten  Bürgerbuche und Stadtbuche der Stadt 
Hannover, Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereins für  Niedersachsen, Band 41, 1-46. 
 
Frensdorff, Ferdinand, 1901. Der Makler im Hansagebiet. In: Festgabe der Göttinger Juristen-
Fakultät für Ferdinand Regelsberger zum siebzigsten Geburtstage am 10. September 1901. 
Göttingen: Duncker & Humblot, 253-316.  
 
Friedland, Klaus, 1991. Die Hanse. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer. 
37 
 
 
Freedman, Paul, 2008. Out of the East: Spices and the Medieval Imagination. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Fruin, J. A., (Ed.), 1882. De oudste Rechten der Stad Dordrecht en van het Baljuwschap van  
Zuidholland, 2 Vol., S' Gravenhaage: Martinus Nijhoff.  
 
Geering, Traugott, 1886. Handel und Industrie der Stadt Basel: Zunftwesen und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte bis zum Ende des XVII Jahrhunderts, aus Archiven dargestellt, Basel: 
Schneider. 
 
Gelderblom, Oscar, 2013. Cities of Commerce, The Institutional Foundation of International Trade 
in the Low Countries 1250-1650. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Gelderblom, Oscar, and Regina Grafe, 2010. The Rise and Fall of the Merchant Guilds: Re-thinking 
the Comparative Study of Commercial Institutions in Premodern Europe. The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 40(4), 477-511. 
 
Gilliodts- van Severen, L., 1881. Les Anciens Règlements de la Corporation de Courtiers de 
Bruges, La Flandre, Revue des monuments d'histoire et d'antiquitiés XII, 121-148, 219-260. 
 
Goldschmidt, Levin, 1882. Urspruenge des Maeklerrechts, insbesondere Sensal. Zeitschrift fuer das 
Gesamte Handelsrecht 28, 115-130. 
 
Gramulla, Gertrud Susanna, 1970. Handelsbeziehungen Koelner Kaufleute zwischen 1500 und 
1650, Dissertation Universität Köln. 
 
Greif, Avner, 1993. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi 
Traders' Coalition. American Economic Review 83 (3), 525-548. 
 
Greif, Avner, 1994. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical 
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies. Journal of Political Economy 102 (5), 912-
950. 
 
Greif, Avner, 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Lessons from Medieval 
Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Greif, Avner, 2006b.The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community Responsible System and 
Impartial Justice.' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2), 221-236. 
 
Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast, 1994. Coordination, Commitment, and 
Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. Journal of Political Economy 102 (4), 745-776. 
 
Gresik, Thomas A. and  and Mark A. Satterthwaite 1989. The rate at which a simple market 
converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading 
mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory 48 (1), 304–332. 
 
Greve, Anke, 2012. Hansekaufleute in Brugge: 6. Teil: Kaufleute, Hosteliers und Herbergen im 
Brugge des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 
 
Grossman, S. and O. Hart, 1980. Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids. The Journal of Finance, 
35(2), 323- 334. 
38 
 
 
Grossman, S., 1981. The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about 
Product Quality. Journal of Law and Economics 24, 461-489. 
 
Groten, Manfred (ed.), 1988-2003. Beschlüße des Rates der Stadt Köln, 1320-1550, vol. 2-6, 
Düsseldorf: Droste.  
 
Groten, Manfred, 1998. Köln im 13. Jahrhundert: gesellschaftlicher Wandel und 
Verfassungsentwicklung. Köln: Böhlau Verlag. 
 
Hamburgisches Staatsarchiv, var. documents. 
 
Hänselmann, Ludwig (ed.), 1900. Urkundenbuch der Stadt Braunschweig II and III, Brauschweig: 
Heinrich Mack. 
 
Harbaugh, Rick, John Maxwell, Beatrice Roussillon, Label Confusion: The Groucho Effect of 
Uncertain Standards. Managment Science 57 (9), 2011. 
 
Heinig, Paul-Joachim, 1983. Reichsstädte, Freie Städte und Königtum, 1389-1450, Wiesbaden: 
Franz Steiner Verlag. 
 
Heijder, M., 1979. Amsterdam, korenschuur van Europa: historische schets van de Amsterdamse 
graanhandel. Amsterdam: Stadsdrukkerij van Amsterdam. 
 
Helten, Josef, 1923. Ueber Entwicklung und Organisation der Kölner Börse 1553-1921, 
Dissertation, Köln. 
 
Herborn, Wolfgang und Klaus Militzer, 1980. Der Kölner Weinhandel, Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke 
Verlag. 
 
Heymann, Ernst, 1898. Das Maklerrecht der Stadt Breslau, Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte 
und Alterthum Schlesiens 33, 369-384. 
 
Hibbert, A. B., 1967. The Economic Policies of Towns, in: M. M. Postan et al. (eds.). The 
Cambridge Econoic History of Europe, Volume III, 157-230. 
 
Hickson, C. R. and E. A. Thompson, 1991. A new theory of guilds and European 
Economic Development. Explorations in Economic History 28, 127- 168. 
 
Hirschfelder, Gunther, 1996. Kölner Fernhandel im Spätmittelalter, in: Geschichtlicher Atlas des 
Rheinlandes, Beiheft VII/7.  
 
Hoehlbaum K., K. Kunze, H. G., Van Rundstedt, and W. Stein, 1876- 1939. Hanisches 
Urkundenbuch, 11 vol. 
 
Hoffmann, Hermann (ed.), 1955. Würzburger Polizeisätze, Gebote und Ordnungen des Mittelalters 
1125-1495, Würzburg: Kommissionsverlag Ferdinand Schöningh. 
 
Houtten, J.-A. van, 1936. Les courtiers au moyen âge. Origine et caractéristiques d'une institution 
commerciale en Europe occidentale. Revue historique de droit français et étranger, Quatrieme série, 
XV, 105-141. 
 
39 
 
Houtten, J.-A. van, 1950. Makelaars en waarden te Brugge van de 13e tot de 16e eeuw. Bijdragen 
voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 5, 1-30, 177-197. 
 
Huiskes, Manfred (ed.) 1990. Beschlüsse des Rates der Stadt Köln, Band 1. Düsseldorf: Droste. 
 
Irsliger, Franz, 1979. Die Wirtschaftliche Stellung der Stadt Köln im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, 
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag. 
 
Irsliger, Franz, 2010. Der Rhein als Handelsstraße im späten Mittelalter, in: Franz J. Felten (ed.), 
Wirtschaft an Rhein und Mosel. Von den Römern bis ins 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 33-56. 
 
Isenmann, Eberhard, 1988. Die deutsche Stadt im Spätmittelalter, 1250-1500, Stuttgart: Verlag 
Eugen Ulmer. 
 
Jäger, Carl, 1828, Die Geschichte der Stadt Heilbronn und ihres ehemiligen Gebietes, vol. 2, 
Heilbronn: In der J. D. Klassischen Buchhandlung. 
 
Jahnke, Carsten 2015. The Baltic Trade, in: Harreld, Donald J.(ed.) A companion to the Hanseatic 
Lague. Leiden: Brill, pp. 194-240. 
 
Johanek, Peter, 2000, Imperial and Free Towns of the Holy Roman Empire, in: Mogens Herman 
Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels 
Forlag. 
 
Kaiser, Reinhold, 1987. Imitationen von Beschau- und Warenzeichen im spaeten Mittelalter. 
Vierteljahrsschrift fuer Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 74, 457-478. 
 
Kellenbenz, Hermann, 1967. Der Aufstieg Kölns zur mittelalterlichen Handelsmetropole, in: 
Gesellschaft für Rheinische Geschichtskunde, Vorträge Nr. 17. 
 
Kellenbenz, Hermann and Rolf Walter, 1986. Das Deutsche Reich 1350-1650. In: 
Wolfram Fischer et al. (eds.). Handbuch der Europaeischen 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, Volume 3, Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 822-893. 
 
Keussen, Hermann, 1910. Topographie der Stadt Köln, 2 Volumes. Bonn: P. Hanstein. 
 
Kimmig, Heinz, and Peter Rüster, 1954. Das Konstanzer Kaufhaus: ein Beitrag zu seiner 
Mittelalterlichen Rechtsgeschichte, Lindau: Thorbecke. 
 
Krueger, Anne, 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. American Economic 
Review 64 (3): 291–303. 
 
Kuske, Bruno, 1903. Die Märkte und Kaufhäuser im mittelalterlichen Köln, in: Jahrbuch des 
Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins, pp. 77-133, Köln: Verlag  Dr. H. G. Lempertz. 
 
Kuske, Bruno, 1905. Der Kölner Fischhandel vom14.-17. Jahrhundert, in: Westdeutsche Zeitschrift  
für Geschichte und Kunst 24, 227-313. 
 
Kuske, Bruno, 1911, Das wirtschaftliche Leben im Kaufhaus Gürzenich und im Fischkaufhaus, 
Mitteilungen des Rheinischen Vereins für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz 5(1), 38-48. 
 
40 
 
Kuske, Bruno, 1914. Die Städtischen Handels- und Verkehrsarbeiter und die Anfänge städtischer 
Sozialpolitik in Köln, Bonn: A. Marcus und E. Webers Verlag. 
 
Kuske, Bruno (ed.), 1917-1934. Quellen zur Geschichte des Kölner Handels und Verkehrs im 
Mittelalter. Bonn: P. Hanstein. 
 
Kuske, Bruno, 1939. Der Kölner Stapel und seine Zusammenhänge als wirtschaftspolitisches 
Beispiel. Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins Köln 21, 1-46. 
 
Kuske, Bruno 1956. Das Schuldenwesen der deutschen Städte im Mittelalter. In: Bruno Kuske, 
Köln, Der Rhein und das Reich. Köln: Böhlau.  
 
Laband, Paul, 1861. Die Lehre von den Maeklern, mit besonderer Beruecksichtigung des Entwurfs 
zum deutschen Handelsgesetzbuche. Zeitschrift fuer deutsches Recht und deutsche 
Rechtswissenschaft 20, 1-65. 
 
Lane, Frederic C., 1958. Economic Consequences of Organized Violence. Journal of Economic 
History 18(4), 401- 417. 
 
Lau Friedrich, 1898. Entwicklung der kommunalen Verfassung und Verwaltung der Stadt Köln bis 
zum Jahre 1396, Bonn: H. Behrendt. 
 
Loesch, Heinrich von, 1907. Die Kölner Zunfturkunden nebst anderen Kölner Gewerbeurkunden 
bis zum Jahre 1500, 2 volumes, Bonn: Hanstein. 
 
Lopez, Robert S., 1976. The Commerical Revolution of the Middle Ages 950-1350. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Malsen, H., 1933. Van Geschiedenis Van Het Makelaarsgild Te Amsterdam 1578-1933. Amsterdam: 
Ten Have. 
 
Matheus, Michael (ed.) 2004. Weinproduktion und Weinkonsum im Mittelalter, Stuttgart: Steiner 
Verlag. 
 
Mathis, Jerome, James  McAndrews, and Jean-Charles Rochet, 2009. Rating the raters: are 
reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies? Journal of Monetary Economics 
56 (5), 657-674. 
 
McCusker, John J. and Cora Gravesteijn, 1991. The Beginnings of Commercial and Financial 
Journalism, Amsterdam: NEHA. 
 
Mecklenburgisches Urkundenbuch, 1863-1936, 25 Vol., Schwerin. 
 
Milgrom, P. (1981), “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,” 
The Bell Journal of Economics, 12: 380-391. 
 
Militzer, Klaus, 1996. Der Rat vor 1396. In: Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln (ed), Stadtrat, 
Stadtrecht, Bürgerfreiheit. Köln: Druckhaus Locher GmbH 1996. pp. 9-20, pp. 21-59. 
 
Militzer, Klaus, 2005. Repertorium der Policeyordnungen der frühen Neuzeit, Volume 6.1-6.2: 
Köln. Frankfurt a. M: Klostermann. 
 
41 
 
Moltke, Siegfried, 1939. Geschichte der Leipziger Maklerschaft, Leipzig: Deichert. 
 
Munro, John H., 1990. Urban Regulation and Monopolistic Competition in the Textile Industries of 
the Late-Medieval Low Countries. In: E. Aerts. And John Munro (eds.), Textiles of the Low 
Countries in European Economic History. Leuven: Leuven University Press. 
 
Munro, John H., 2003. Medieval woollens: textiles, textile technology, and industrial organization, 
c. 800-1500. In: David Jenkins (ed.): The Cambridge History of Western Textiles, vol.1. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 186-227. 
 
Murray, James, 2005. Bruges, Cradle of Capitalism, 1280-1390. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Myerson, Roger B. and Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1983. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. 
Journal of Economic Theory 29 (2), 265–281. 
 
Noordkerk, H., 1748. Handfesten van Amsterdam. Amsterdam. 
 
Nübling, Eugen, 1890. Ulms Baumwollweberei im Mittelalter: Urkunden und Darstellung; ein 
Beitrag zur Deutschen Städte- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot. 
 
Ogilvie, Sheila, 2004. Guilds, efficiency and social capital: evidence from German proto-industry. 
The Economic History Review 57(2), 286-333. 
 
Ogilvie, Sheila 2007. 'Whatever is, is right?' Economic Institutions in pre-industrial Europe. 
Economic History Review 60(4), 649-684. 
 
Ogilvie, Sheila, 2008. Rehabilitating the guilds: a reply. The Economic History Review 61(1), 175-
182. 
 
Ogilivie, Sheila, 2011. Institutions and European Trade: Merchant Guilds, 1000-1800. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pauli, Carl W., 1847.. Lübeckische Zustände im Mittelalter, vol. 3. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 
 
Pelsmaeker, P. De, 1905. Le Courtage a Ypres aux XIII et XIV Siecles. Bulletin de la Commission 
royale d’histoire LXXIV, 439-484. 
 
Pols, M. S., 1888.Westfriesche Stadtrechten, 'S Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Pommersche Jahrbücher, 1901. Vol. 2, Greifswald: Julius Abel. 
 
Postan, M. M., 1987. The Trade of Medieval Europe. In: Postan et al. (eds.).  The Cambridge 
Economic History of Europe, Volume 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 168-305. 
 
Radkau, Joachim and Ingrid Schäfer, 2007. Holz: Wie ein Naturstoff Geschichte schreibt. Oekom 
Verlag: München. 
 
Richardson, Gary, 2004, Guilds, Laws, and Markets for Manufactured Merchandise in Late 
Medieval England, Explorations in Economic History 41, 1-25. 
 
Rose, Susanne, 2011. Wine trade in medieval Europe, 1000 -1500. London: Continuum. 
42 
 
 
Roth, Johann Ferdinand, 1802. Geschichte des Nürnbergischen Handels, 4 vol., Leipzig: Adam 
Friedrich Böhme. 
 
Roth, Alvin E. 2008. What have we Learned from Market Design. Economic Journal 188 (527), 
285-310. 
 
Rothmann, Michael, 1998. Die Frankfurter Messen im Mittelalter, Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart. 
 
Schmieder, Eberhard, 1937. Die Unterkaeufer im Mittelalter. Vierteljahrsschrift fuer Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 30, 229-260. 
 
Schmoller, Gustav, 1879. Die Straßburger Tucher- und Weberzunft, Straßburg. 
 
Schnell, Johannes (ed.), 1856-65. Rechtsquellen von Basel: Stadt und Land, 2 vol., Basel: 
Bahnmaier. 
 
Schönfelder, Wilhelm, 1970. Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Kölns von 1370-1513, Köln: Böhlau 
Verlag. 
 
Schubert, Hartmut, 1962. Unterkauf und Unterkäufer in Frankfurt am Main im Mittelalter, 
Dissertation, Frankfurt. 
 
Sicking, Louis and Darelene Abredu-Ferreira, 2009. Beyond the Catch, Fisheries of the North 
Atlantic, the North Sea, and the Baltics, 900-1850, Leiden: Brill. 
 
Simson, Paul, 1904. Die Geschichte der Danziger Wilkür, Danzig: L. Saunier Buch- und 
Kunsthandlung. 
 
Spulber, Daniel, 1996. Market Microstructure and Intermediation. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 10, 135-152. 
 
Stein, Walter (ed.), 1893 -1895. Akten zur Geschichte der Verfassung und Verwaltung der Stadt 
Köln im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, 2 volumes. Bonn. 
 
Stolze, Thomas Adam, 1901. Die Entstehung des Gästerechts in den Deutschen Städten des 
Mittelalters. 
 
Stuart, Theodorus, 1879. De Amsterdamsche Makelaardij. Amsterdam: C.A. Spin & Zoon. 
 
Tielhof, Milja van, 2002. The “Mother of All Trades”, The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from 
Late 16th until the Early 19th Century, Leiden: Brill. 
 
Toebelmann, Kurt, 1911. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Maklerrechts nach süddeutschen Quellen, 
Disseration Universität Göttingen, Stuttgart. 
 
Tullok, Gordon, 1967. The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western Economic 
Journal 5 (3), 224–232. 
 
Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck, 1842-1932. 11 Vol., Lübeck (Reprint Osnabrück: Wenner) 
 
Uytven, R. van, 1965. Die Bedeutung des Kölner Weinmarkts im 15. Jahrhundert. Rheinische 
43 
 
Vierteljahrsblätter 30, 234-252. 
 
Volk, Otto, 1993. Weinbau und Weinabsatz im Späten Mittelalter, Forschungsstand und 
Forschungsprobleme, in: Alois Gerlich, Weinbau, Weinhandel und Weinkultur, Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag. 49-165. 
 
Waldner, Eugene, 1907. Veröffentlichungen aus dem Stadtarchiv Colmar. Colmar. 
 
Warschauer, Adolf (ed.) 1892. Stadtbuch von Posen, erster Band, Posen: Historische Gesellschaft 
für die Provinz Posen. 
 
Westermann, Ekkehardt (ed.), 1979. Internationaler Ochsenhandel (1350-1750): Akten des 7th 
International Economic History Congress, Edinburgh 1978. Stutgart: Klett-Cotta. 
 
Wolf, Armin (ed.) 1969. Die Gesetze der Stadt Frankfurt am Main im Mittelalter, Frankfurt a. M.: 
Waldemar Kramer. 
 
Wollschlaeger, Hermann, M., 1988. Hansestadt Köln, die Geschichte einer europäischen 
Handelsmetropole. Köln: Wienand. 
 
Zuijderduijn, Jaco, 2009.  Medieval Capital Markets, Markets for renten State Formation and 
Private Investment in Holland (1350-1550). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Appendix A: Tables of Statistics 
 
Table 1: Brokerage Designs Descriptive Statistics 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
 
 
designs 
#obser-
vations 
 
# cities period 
mean 
(st. dev.) 
period  
min 
max 
population 
mean 
(st. dev.) 
population 
min 
max 
river port 
share 
seaport 
share 
# trade routes  
mean 
brokerage 
privilege 
820 48 1462 
(117) 
1252 
1699 
35795 
(27692) 
1000 
137220 
0.46 0.41 5.38 
matching 409 32 1454 
(121) 
1252 
1699 
38809 
(30046) 
1200 
122600 
0.31 0.51 4.83 
quality 
certification 
all  
243 26 1549 
(104) 
1291 
1699 
34923 
(23481) 
1000 
78500 
0.46 0.44 6.24 
 product  
certification 
236 25 1549 
(105) 
1291 
1699 
34068 
(23101) 
1000 
72980 
0.46 0.43 6.25 
creditor 
certification 
128 11 1609 
(86) 
1406 
1699 
48662 
(20883) 
4595 
78500 
0.22 0.77 5.73 
tax collection 173 24 1473 
(94) 
1285 
1688 
16605 
(14237) 
4420 
66400 
0.74 0.14 5.84 
 
 
design combinations        
matching, 
certification, 
and tax coll. 
24 7 1486 
(82) 
1372 
1685 
15213 
(10405) 
4595 
44300 
0.88 0.08 7.20 
matching and 
certification 
124 16 1579 
(113) 
1300 
1699 
42271 
(23801) 
4595 
78500 
0.40 0.55 6.64 
matching and 
tax coll. 
49 8 1493 
(75) 
1372 
1685 
14977 
(9128) 
4595 
44300 
0.73 0.22 6.16 
certification 
and tax coll. 
35 8 1478 
(80) 
1372 
1685 
13712 
(10662) 
4595 
44300 
0.80 0.06 6.62 
 
exclusive designs 
        
only 
matching 
260 25 1392 
(72) 
1252 
1675 
39532 
(33049) 
4210 
122600 
0.24 0.50 3.94 
only 
certification 
107 18 1528 
(81) 
1291 
1642 
28927 
(21176) 
1000 
71520 
0.50 0.36 5.87 
only tax 
collection 
112 21 1465 
(100) 
1285 
1688 
17636 
(16646) 
4420 
66400 
0.76 0.12 5.75 
  
total # 
observations 
 
1611 
 
70 
 
1472 
(108) 
 
1241 
1699 
 
34161 
(26838) 
 
1000 
137220 
 
0.50 
 
0.39 
 
5.55 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the number of observations and cities that can be assigned to different brokerage designs. Columns (3) to (9) 
report the mean, minimum and maximum values for quantitative variables and the shares of all observations for categorical variables for period, 
demographic, and trade-geographic characteristics related to different brokerage designs. 
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Table 2: Product Genres Descriptive Statistics 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
 
 
products 
#obser-
vations 
 
# cities period 
mean  
(st. dev.) 
period 
min 
max 
population 
mean  
(st.dev.) 
population 
min  
max 
river port 
share 
seaport 
share 
# trade routes  
mean 
wine & beer 
 
124 33 1459 
(100) 
1252 
1688 
23617 
(21977) 
1200 
107150 
0.69 0.19 5.62 
grain 78 26 1467 
(125) 
1252 
1692 
36800 
(25003) 
4360 
170150 
0.35 0.58 4.27 
fish 89 22 1499 
(82) 
1320 
1692 
29027 
(20396) 
1000 
125000 
0.67 0.21 7.49 
cattle & meat 51 19 1461 
(87) 
 
1252 
1650 
23166 
(16673) 
1200 
45100 
0.76 0.14 6.98 
oil, fat & 
butter 
61 23 1463 
(112) 
1252 
1692 
30286 
(27172) 
4904 
107150 
0.39 0.48 5.03 
spices & dyes 77 27 1477 
(103) 
1252 
1692 
33107 
(25113) 
4700 
107150 
0.45 0.40 5.31 
raw textiles 104 28 1459 
(102) 
1252 
1692 
31370 
(26214) 
4559 
107150 
0.64 0.26 5.44 
fur, skin & 
leather 
81 24 1448 
(101) 
1252 
1699 
36332 
(27419) 
1200 
107150 
0.58 0.30 5.79 
cloth 108 32 1434 
(98) 
1247 
1692 
32411 
(25722) 
3000 
107150 
0.65 0.23 5.69 
construction 
material 
78 22 1513 
(115) 
1252 
1692 
37438 
(25512) 
 
4370 
107150 
0.50 0.49 5.71 
metal 61 21 1448 
(105) 
1252 
1692 
29396 
(28150) 
4601 
107150 
0.33 0.54 5.33 
finance 103 24 1498 
(126) 
1276 
1699 
412449 
(24076) 
4700 
122600 
0.49 0.38 6.00 
property  47 16 1514 
(114) 
1276 
1698 
36811 
(25983) 
4300 
114200 
0.47 0.40 5.59 
horses 83 24 1451 
(88) 
1252 
1667 
28186 
(24663) 
4700 
107150 
0.64 0.18 6.18 
total 1611 70 1472 
(108) 
1241 
1699 
34161 
(26838) 
1000 
137220 
0.50 0.39 5.55 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the number of observations and towns that can be assigned to brokerage for specific products. Columns (3) to (9) 
report the mean, minimum and maximum values for quantitative variables and the shares of all observations for categorical variables for period, 
demographic, and trade-geographic characteristics related to brokerage for different products. 
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Table 3: Product Genres and Brokerage Designs Descriptive Statistics 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
 
 
products 
#obser-
vations 
 
# 
cities 
brokerage 
privilege 
matching certification 
all  
quality 
certificti
on 
creditwort
hiness 
tax 
collection 
matching and 
certification 
wine & beer 
 
124 33 0.54 0.34 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.05 
grain 78 26 0.67 0.32 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.09 
fish 89 22 0.42 0.20 0.42 0.42 0.06 0.06 0.09 
cattle & meat 50 19 0.58 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.10 
oil, fat & 
butter 
61 23 0.72 0.41 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.08 0.08 
spices & dyes 77 27 0.70 0.45 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.16 
raw textiles 104 28 0.63 0.39 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.12 
fur, skin & 
leather 
81 24 0.73 0.38 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.11 
cloth 108 32 0.64 0.31 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.07 
construction 
material 
78 22 0.67 0.37 0.36 0.35 
 
0.22 0.04 0.18 
metal 61 21 0.67 0.41 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.11 
finance 103 24 0.65 0.28 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.15 
property  47 16 0.66 0.32 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.17 
horses 83 24 0.61 0.29 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.17 0.05 
total 
 
 70 0.51 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.08 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the number of observations and towns that can be assigned to brokerage for specific products. Columns (3) to (9) 
report the shares of all observations for different brokerage designs related to specific product groups. 
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Table 1A: Statistical Significance Tests for Brokerage Designs  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
period 
paired t-test 
population 
paired t-test 
river 
port 
seaport # trade routes 
 
 
 
design 
(a) 
difference=  
mean 
regulation - 
mean other 
obs. 
 
 
(b) 
t-value 
 
(c) 
p-value 
 
 
(a) 
difference=  
mean 
regulation – 
mean other 
obs. 
 
 
(b) 
t-value 
 
(c) 
p-value 
 
 
 
chi2 
p-value 
 
chi2 
p-value 
 
 
(a) 
difference=  
mean 
regulation –
mean other 
obs. 
 
 
(b) 
t-value 
 
(c) 
p-value 
 
 
brokerage 
privilege 
19.70 3.66 0.00 -3422 -2.57 001 10.51 
0.001 
2.920 
0.087 
0.35 2.62 0.00 
matching 24.36 3.94 0.00 -6263 -4.10 0.00 76.75 
0.000 
33.91 
0.000 
0.97 6.33 0.000 
quality 
certification 
all  
-91.46 -12.69 0.00 -846 -0.45 0.32 1.78 
0.182 
2.88 
0.090 
-0.80 -4.28 0.00 
 product  
certification 
-91.10 -12.46 0.00 165 0.09 0.47 1.63 
0.201 
2.35 
0.126 
-0.80 -4.22 0.00 
creditor 
certification 
-148.84 -16.05 0.00 -15741 -6.44 0.00 44.10 
0.000 
87.35 
0.000 
-0.19 -0.76 0.22 
tax collection -0.47 -0.07 0.47 19840 9.41 0.00 46.67 
0.000 
50.48 
0.000 
-0.32 -1.50 0.07 
design combinations           
matching, 
certification, 
and tax coll. 
-22.83 -1.02 0.15 18725 3.41 0.00 14.70 
0.000 
9.49 
0.002 
-1.67 -3.04 0.00 
matching and 
certification 
-113.37 -11.64 0.00 -8729 -3.50 0.00 5.03 
0.025 
14.67 
0.000 
-1.16 -4.63 0.00 
matching and 
tax coll. 
-20.61 -1.31 0.10 19663 5.10 0.00 11.14 
0.001 
5.65 
0.017 
-0.63 -1.61 0.00 
certification 
and tax coll. 
-12.34 -0.67 0.25 20535 4.50 0.00 13.72 
0.000 
17.08 
0.000 
-1.01 -2.39 0.01 
Notes: The table indicates whether different brokerage designs are statistically significantly related to specific periodic, demographic, and trade-
geographic distributions of brokerage regulations. Column (1) reports paired t-tests comparing differences in the period mean for specific regulations 
and the mean of the total number of all other observations. Column (1a) reports differences between the period mean for specific regulations and the 
mean of all other observations; (1b), the related t-values; and (1c), the related p-values. Similarly, column (2) reports paired t-tests for differences in 
population size. Columns (3) and (4) report whether specific brokerage designs are statistically significantly related to cities with river ports or 
seaports. The columns reveal Pearson’s Chi-square statistics for one degree of freedom and associated p-values. Column (5) reports paired t-tests for 
differences in the mean number of trade routes passing through a city for specific regulations vs. the mean for the number of trade routes relative to 
the total number of all other observations. 
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Table 2A: Statistical Significance Tests for Product Genres 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
period population river 
port 
seaport # trade routes 
 
 
 
products 
(a) 
difference = 
mean  
product type 
– mean 
other obs. 
 
 
(b) 
t-value 
 
(c) 
p-value 
 
 
(a) 
difference = 
mean  
product 
type – mean 
other obs. 
 
(b) 
t-value 
 
(c) 
p-value 
 
 
 
chi2 
p-value 
 
 
chi2 
p-value 
 
 
(a) 
difference = 
mean  
product 
type – mean 
other obs. 
 
(b) 
t-value 
 
(c) 
p-value 
 
 
wine & beer 
 
13.85 1.37 0.09 11438 4.59 0.00 18.43 
0.000 
21.26 
0.000 
-0.075 -0.30 0.38 
grain 5.39 0.43 0.33 -2760 -0.89 0.18 7.79 
0.005 
12.42 
0.000 
1.39 4.33 0.00 
fish -27.95 -2.37 0.01 5849 1.86 0.03 11.39 
0.001 
12.00 
0.001 
-2.06 -7.10 0.00 
cattle & 
meat 
10.76 0.69 0.24 11756 3.06 0.01 134.73 
0.000 
13.88 
0.000 
-1.47 -3.82 0.00 
oil, fat & 
butter 
9.67 0.68 0.25 4040 1.15 0.12 2.90 
0.089 
2.07 
0.150 
0.54 1.53 0.06 
spices & 
dyes 
-5.97 -0.47 0.32 1120 0.36 0.36 0.68 
0.410 
0.08 
0.778 
0.25 0.80 0.21 
raw textiles 14.22 1.29 0.098 2998 1.10 0.14 9.75 
0.002 
8.02 
0.005 
0.12 0.43 0.33 
fur, skin & 
leather 
25.88 2.10 0.02 -2273 -0.74 0.23 2.18 
0.140 
2.98 
0.084 
-0.25 -0.82 0.21 
cloth 40.55 3.77 0.00 1889 0.71 0.24 10.12 
0.001 
11.85 
0.001 
-0.14 -0.53 0.30 
construction 
material 
-43.13 -3.44 0.00 -3431 -1.10 0.14 0.00 
0.996 
3.44 
0.064 
-0.16 -0.51 0.30 
metal 24.82 1.75 0.04 4966 1.42 0.08 0.42 
0.517 
0.94 
0.331 
0.23 0.66 0.25 
finance -27.80 -2.52 0.01 -7560 -2.77 0.00 0.10 
0.755 
0.04 
0.851 
-0.48 -1.75 0.04 
property  -42.74 -2.67 0.00 -2717 -0.68 0.25 0.20 
0.654 
0.06 
0.809 
-0.05 -0.11 0.46 
horses 21.97 1.80 0.04 6313 2.09 0.02 6.89 
0.010 
15.74 
0.000 
-0.66 -2.19 0.02 
Notes: The table indicates whether product characteristics are statistically significantly related to periodic, demographic, and trade-geographic 
distributions of brokerage regulations. Column (1) reports paired t-tests comparing differences in the period mean of rules for specific products 
with the mean of the total number of all other observations. Column (1a) reports the differences between the period mean of the specific product 
and the mean of the number of all other observations; (1b), the related t-values; and (1c), the related p-values. Similarly, column (2) reports the 
results of paired t-tests for differences in population size. Columns (3) and (4) report whether brokerage regulations for specific products are 
statistically significantly related to cities with river or seaports. The columns report Pearson’s Chi-square statistics for one degree of freedom and 
associated p-values. Column (5) reports paired t-test for differences in the mean number of trade routes passing through a city for regulations for 
specific products vs. the mean for the number of trade routes relative to the total number of all other observations. 
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Table 3A: Statistical Significance Tests for Product Genres and Brokerage Designs 
 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
 
products 
#obser-
vations 
 
 brokerage 
privilege 
matching certificat
ion all  
quality 
certificatio
n 
creditwor
thiness 
tax 
collection 
matching and 
certification 
wine & beer 
 
124  0.52 
0.472 
5.33 
0.021 
4.05 
0.044 
3.59 
0.058 
7.37 
0.007 
4.07 
0.044 
1.50 
0.220 
grain 78  8.12 
0.004 
1.89 
0.169 
0.01 
0.939 
0.04 
0.861 
1.45 
0.229 
8.17 
0.004 
0.18 
0.668 
fish 89  3.30 
0.069 
1.35 
0.246 
51.61 
0.000 
54.62 
0.000 
0.70 
0.404 
2.58 
0.108 
0.22 
0.642 
cattle & meat 50  0.74 
0.389 
0.94 
0.331 
4.45 
0.035 
3.32 
0.068 
1.17 
0.280 
8.99 
0.003 
0.32 
0.569 
oil, fat & 
butter 
61  11.33 
0.001 
8.04 
0.004 
1.92 
0.166 
2.25 
0.134 
2.32 
0.128 
0.43 
0.513 
0.02 
0.885 
spices & dyes  77  11.40 
0.001 
17.09 
0.000 
4.34 
0.037 
2.43 
0.119 
8.83 
0.003 
0.01 
0.919 
7.04 
0.008 
raw textiles 104 
 
6.39 
0.011 
10.98 
0.001 
0.37 
0.542 
0.56 
0.455 
1.86 
0.172 
0.17 
0.678 
2.18 
0.140 
fur, skin & 
leather 
81  16.38 
0.000 
7.41 
0.006 
0.32 
0.570 
0.47 
0.491 
5.50 
0.019 
0.07 
0.797 
1.39 
2.39 
cloth 108  7.78 
0.005 
1.60 
0.206 
0.41 
0.524 
0.26 
0.608 
0.27 
0.601 
0.70 
0.403 
0.02 
0.902 
construction 
material 
78  8.12 
0.004 
5.96 
0.015 
27.72 
0.000 
26.13 
0.000 
21.50 
0.000 
4.06 
0.044 
12.07 
0.001 
metal 61  6.73 
0.010 
8.08 
0.004 
0.019 
0.661 
0.51 
0.475 
0.31 
0.578 
3.52 
0061 
1.26 
0.261 
finance 103  8.27 
0.004 
0.43 
0.512 
0.97 
0.324 
0.70 
0.402 
8.66 
0.003 
1.78 
0.182 
7.26 
0.007 
property  47  4.37 
0.036 
1.07 
0.301 
2.62 
0.106 
1.70 
0.192 
15.82 
0.000 
0.00 
0.982 
5.90 
0.015 
horses 83  3.87 
0.049 
0.56 
0.455 
3.02 
0.082 
2.70 
0.100 
3.66 
0.056 
3.43 
0.064 
1.03 
0.310 
Notes: The table indicates whether brokerage for a specific product is statistically significantly related to different brokerage designs. Columns (2) to 
(8) reveal Pearson’s chi-square statistics for one degree of freedom and the associated p-values. 
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Appendix B: Maps 
 
 
Map 1: Sample of Cities with and without Brokerage 
 
 
Notes: The dots mark all towns that are investigated and had, following Bairoch (1988), 5000 inhabitants at least once 
during the investigation period (1200-1700). The red named dots indicate the existence of brokerage. Other towns 
(without brokerage) are marked by black dots. 
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Map 2: Cities with Brokerage with Matchmaking Functions 
 
 
Notes: Cities with brokerage with matchmaking functions are marked with yellow dots and named. Other cities with 
brokerage (following map 1) are marked with red dots and named. The remaining towns are marked only by black dots. 
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Map 3: Towns with Brokerage with Certification Functions 
´ 
 
Notes: Cities with brokerage with certification functions are marked with yellow dots and named. Other cities with 
brokerage (following map 1) are marked with red dots and named. The remaining towns are marked only by black dots. 
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Map 4: Towns with Brokerage with Tax Collection Functions 
 
 
Notes: Cities with brokerage with tax collection functions are marked with yellow dots and named. Other cities with 
brokerage (following map 1) are marked with red dots and named. The remaining towns are marked only by black dots. 
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Map 5: Towns with Grain Brokerage and Trade Routes 
 
 
Notes: Cities with grain brokerage are marked with yellow dots and named. Yellow dashed lines indicate the main grain 
trade routes. Other cities with brokerage (following map 1) are marked with red color dots and named. The remaining 
towns are marked only by black dots. 
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Map 6: Wine Brokerage and Trade Routes 
 
Notes: Cities with wine brokerage are marked with purple dots and named. Purple dashed lines indicate the main wine 
trade routes. Other cities with brokerage (following map 1) are marked with red dots and named. The remaining towns 
are marked only by black dots. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
